Hezbollah And Spain

Presence And Attention:
Discreet, But Relevant

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1. Introduction

The research of the presence and interest in Spain and our interests abroad by the Lebanese Party of God (henceforth, Hezbollah) compels us to consider two dimensions: this terrorist group’s little, quite unknown visibility on Spanish soil, as well as this group’s interest in Spanish citizens and their interests beyond its borders, with a special attention on the diplomatic and military presence of Spain in Lebanon. It has also been necessary sometimes to incorporate in our analysis direct references to the Islamic Republic of Iran since this country and Hezbollah have very close ties.

2. Background of Hezbollah and Its Affiliates’ Terrorist Activity in Spain

If we begin our research as a journey covering terrorist activity on Spanish soil, we will see that, first, we can never directly identify Hezbollah, but its affiliate groups, both for their Lebanese origins and Shiite faith, organizations named by some analysts as actual “shadow actors” of the Lebanese Party of God. We will see that terrorist attacks on Spanish soil took place when Hezbollah began its consolidation as an armed actor using terrorist tactics in Lebanon – a national and transnational consolidation from the beginning. Hezbollah’s birth added to an already wide range of Middle Eastern terrorist groups acting inside and outside the region at that time.

On July 24, 1984, three Iranian citizens were arrested in Barcelona and another one in Madrid, all accused of being members of the terrorist organization “Islamic Revolution Martyrs,” planning a terrorist attack on a Saudi plane and an Iranian dissident in Madrid. As a result of these arrests, an Iranian diplomat was expelled from Spain. Next month, on August 5, a Kuwaiti citizen, owner of a paper supporting Iraq against Iran, was wounded.
and his chauffeur killed in a terrorist attack in Marbella a Shiite terrorist organization, “Islamic Jihad,” claimed responsibility for the attack. That year, on September 12, the so-called “Musa Sadr Brigades”, the Lebanese Shiites armed branch, Amal, wounded a Libyan diplomat in Madrid, and a Saudi citizen was murdered two days later in Marbella, in an attack claimed again by “Islamic Jihad.” This group’s activity, also involved in multiple violent acts in other Western countries, reached its climax in Spain with the April 12, 1985 tragic attack on “El Descanso” restaurant, in the outskirts of Madrid. It claimed the lives of 18 people and wounded 82, and although “Islamic Jihad” actually claimed its responsibility from Lebanon, other actors were likely involved. Thirty years later, several analysts keep putting the blame on Hezbollah.

Despite what has been aforementioned, according to Gustavo de Arístegui, Spain was never a primary target for Hezbollah or for other more or less closely related groups during the 1980s. It was not their target because Spain’s diplomatic recognition of the State of Israel and the establishment of full diplomatic ties with that country in 1986 was late if compared to other countries of our region. Yet it is true that this terrorist activity is relevant, and the attack on “El Descanso” restaurant, undoubtedly carried out by Hezbollah, according to Arístegui, was then the deadliest among the attacks outside Lebanon.

If we remember along those old actors aforementioned so far, Musa Sadr was a young Iranian cleric who founded the Amal movement in Lebanon; Musa Sadr disappeared mysteriously during a trip to Libya in 1978, and that since 1985, ten years after the start of the civil war in Lebanon, Amal’s most radical elements went to create “Islamic Amal,” which became Hezbollah’s embryo. Add to that the moves of the Iranian embassy in Beirut and we have just pinpointed the origin of this terrorist group and also of those groups already acting in Spain within its context. Another relevant Spanish analyst, General Miguel Ángel Ballesteros Martín, remembers how Hezbollah is considered – according to other sources – the final outcome of the amalgamation of groups such as Islamic Jihad, the “Organization of the Oppressed on Earth,” and the “Revolutionary Justice Organization.”

Hezbollah’s trail would be found and confirmed late in the 1980s when members of that terrorist group moved throughout our country. In November 1989, the National Police arrested some Hezbollah’s elements in Madrid and Valencia’s port because they were trafficking in plastic explosives, hidden in 19 Lebanese food cans. It was then considered that the 440 pound
of explosives seized were intended to prepare terrorist attacks on American and French targets in Europe. Nonetheless, Aristegui points again to the possibility that they were intended to attack on American and Israeli targets, both inside and outside Spain.9

3. Difficulties classifying Hezbollah as a Terrorist Group

Besides Hezbollah’s lethal activity during its first years, attacking not only Israeli forces on Lebanese territory or Lebanese opponents within the context of civil war in which it was born, but also attacking international forces deployed in Beirut –America and France were also targets of cruel terrorist attacks in 1983-, the group’s mark could be early found in far-off world scenarios, and always linked to terrorist activities. That is the case of 1993 and 1994 anti-Semitic attacks in Argentina, first against the Israel embassy and later against the AMIA Community Building, both in Buenos Aires.10 Even in terms of typical practice for a terrorist group, Hezbollah is included by well-known specialist Loretta Napoleoni in her famous work on terrorist finance: Hezbollah is and was ubiquitous, as ETA or the IRA, with members from these three organizations meeting in South America, and it also has and had in common with ETA, according to this author, an intensive use of the “revolutionary tax” for funding purposes.11

All this, plus Hezbollah’s practice of putting pressure on Lebanese politics and keeping and fostering Lebanese hostility against the Israeli enemy, questioning the very existence of this State –following the steps of its main supporting State, Iran-, has caused that many European countries act against Hezbollah as if it were a clearly designated terrorist group. This group’s anti-Semitism, broadcasted via its satellite TV channel “Al-Manar” is so evident that some European Union states quickly banned its broadcasting. “Al-Manar” was broadcasted in Western Europe countries via several satellite corporations, among them: Eutelsat, Arabsat and Newskies. In December 2004, the French State Council acknowledged that the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) was right and ordered Eutelsat to immediately stop that channel’s emission throughout the French territory, due to that channel’s programming contents, which advances overall racial hatred, particularly anti-Semitism.12 That year, Spain also banned this TV channel, a well-appreciated measure by Western anti-terrorist sources, a priority since it was using our territory to broadcast to Latin America. More recently, on December 21, 2011, the inauguration of Spanish-spoken Iranian TV channel, “Hispan TV”, intended to project Iran’s vision to Spain and Latin America,13
forces us not only to remember the previous experience of “Al-Manar”, but it must also be related to a declaration by Barack H. Obama to *El Universal*, a Caracas-based newspaper. The American president pointed out that the U.S. closely watches Iran’s projection in Latin America.¹⁴

Beyond these measures, which have not been uniformly adopted within the EU, the lack of a strong, clear verdict in Buenos Aires and, above all, Hezbollah’s political legitimization in its own country, Lebanon, where it participates in the election process since 1992 – granting legitimacy to its role as a weapon for armed resistance against Israel —, have not only prevented the addition of this group into the *European Union List of Terrorist Groups and Individuals*. It is periodically updated by the EU, but Community officials and EU member states usually deal with Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese Ministers and senior officials in an absolutely normal way, as opposed to the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which is included –both its military branch and political component– in the aforementioned *List*.¹⁶

4. Spanish Vulnerabilities at Hezbollah’s Sanctuary

In this chapter, we will review Lebanon, where the reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) contingent by the summer of 2006 would bring Spain and its thousands of troops closer to Hezbollah’s sanctuary.

This situation can be set in the context of three successive events occurred by mid-decade. First, the increasing international pressure to expel the Syrian residual military contingent from Lebanon in 2004, estimated in 14,000 troops. Second, the murder of Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, and other 22 people in a huge terrorist attack in Beirut; a terrorist action –today some sources still try to involve Hezbollah- that creates an internal crisis in Lebanon and speeds up the exit of Syrian troops. And finally, the outbreak of a war between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006, which ended with an armistice guaranteed by the deployment of this UNIFIL reinforcement in southern Lebanon.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 was passed thanks to France and the U.S. in September 2004, which asked for both Syrian military withdrawal –ultimately achieved– and militia disarmament and demobilization, mainly Hezbollah’s, still unresolved as late as 2012.
Regarding the murder of Rafik Hariri, it constituted a change for the Lebanese society, which in spite of the Taif Peace in 1989 (Hariri had been one of its architects), had not yet got over the wounds of its long civil war. As for Spain, the then Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos, close friend of the victim, traveled from Cairo to his funeral.

The war in 2006 and the armistice, which marked the end of the war, resulted in the UNIFIL reinforcement, with the Spanish contingent as one of the most important (the others were the French and Italian contingents). The implementation of Resolution 1701, voted by the Security Council on August 11, 2006, established a ceasefire, and the omnipresent Resolution 1559, have both been the legal basis justifying the “blue helmets” presence in this dangerous scenario since then. Precisely, the zeal of these “blue helmets” inside Hezbollah’s lair has put them in danger, as the terrorist attack on Spanish paratroopers –six of them died in southern Lebanon on June 24, 2007 – dramatically showed. Talking to Congress on July 2, 2007, the then Defense Minister José Antonio Alonso said – echoing investigators from National Intelligence Center (CNI) – the six paratroopers were killed by non-Lebanese terrorists backed by Lebanese jihadists, members of two unnamed organizations. Nearly three years later, when Spanish Major General Alberto Asarta Cuevas took over UNIFIL, the investigation was at a standstill. Though there is no light on the true responsible for that attack as late as 2012, and while there is nothing but speculation on possible Hezbollah’s responsibility, it is good to raise this hypothesis. Apart from the fact that terrorist attack was committed in the midst of its influence area, in which the group and its supporters traditionally brag about controlling everything; another major argument to put the responsibility of the massacre close to Hezbollah would be the fierce control the UNIFIL troops, especially the Spanish, were imposing on Hezbollah. In meticulously enforcing Resolution 1559, Spaniards were making life difficult for the Shiite militia and had even inadvertently found some of their arsenals.

While EU has not yet included Hezbollah in its periodically updated list of terrorist groups, Lebanese group activity inside and outside the “Cedar Country” does not go unnoticed. Arab world considers it as a resistance group against Israel, and no State publicly calls it terrorist. Nevertheless, its activity and possibly the fight against it, show that it is really a threat to security, and not only to Israel. So was it proved by arrests of about fifty Hezbollah members by Egyptian law enforcement in the Sinai Peninsula in April 2009. They had infiltrated Egyptian territory to prepare terrorist
attacks on both Egyptian and American interests. One year before, in Lebanon, after a May 2008 strike which worsened intercommunity tensions, Hezbollah was about to contribute to a new conflict. The group had also radicalized its position after its security leader Imad Mugnïeh was killed in Damascus on February 12, 2008. It led Sheik Hassan Nasrallah to go underground, and there has he remained since the end of the war in 2006.

When the aforesaid Spanish General took over the 11,800 troops of twenty-nine countries, which form UNIFIL, there was an increase of vulnerable points while the Spanish Government was trying to avoid that such perception became public. Pride and joy were in abundance in Naquora, the UNIFIL Headquarters, on January 28, 2010, when Defense Minister Carme Chacón and a parliamentarian group attended the ceremony of General Asarta assuming powers from Italian General Claudio Graziano. Spain was then beginning its rotating EU Presidency term and the José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero Administration aspired to turn Spanish six-month period into the Middle East Peace Process moment. In fact, 2010 was not a favorable year for peace, and regarding southern Lebanon, home of Hezbollah and the deployment area of General Asarta's forces, the background was increasingly worrying because of two particularly serious events. The tension grew due to the investigation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), created by the U.N. to investigate Hariri’s murder. The Spanish EU Presidency through first 2010 six months finished in late June, in the middle of a verbal escalation mainly provoked by Hezbollah, when it said this judicial body’s ruling - described by Hezbollah as “pro-Israeli” - would be against this group: this led some Lebanese leaders, like pro-Hezbollah Druze Wiam Wahhab, to claim; “If the STL issues a verdict causing discord in Lebanon, UNIFIL will be in peril”. Regarding the events, these were a confrontation at the border town of Adaisseh on August 3, which claimed the lives of two Lebanese troops, a journalist, and an Israeli officer; in addition to the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadineyad in October.

Ahmadineyad delivered an aggressive speech at the town of Bint Jbeil, named as the “resistance capital” by Hezbollah, and just 2.5 miles away from Israeli border.

Vulnerabilities went on beyond the expected time when, in December, U.N. General Secretary Ban Ki-moon communicated Spain the decision to keep General Asarta in charge of the mission one more year. The extension also
coincided with one of the most delicate moments in general in the Near East, and particularly in southern Lebanon. In January 2011, Hezbollah caused a serious political crisis in Lebanon when ten Ministers of its block – “March 8 Coalition,” in which there are also Amal’s Shiites and Michel Aoun’s Christians, opposed to “March 14 Coalition” led by Saad Hariri –, left the Government, in an attempt to avoid STL to make public its summings-ups on Rafik Hariri’s killing, supposedly involving Hezbollah.\(^{32}\) Appointing multimillionaire Najib Mikati – a man close to and backed by Hezbollah – as Prime Minister put an end to the visible part of an institutional crisis, but it kept alive the conflict between major Lebanese actors.

As for the purely diplomatic dimension, Spain, as well as the other EU member States, has followed an extremely prudent attitude within the Lebanese complex scenario. In addition to very intense diplomatic relations in the last decade, Spain actively participated in both Donors Conference held after the war of 2006, one in Stockholm and the other in Doha, and the €45 million Spain promised would dedicate to rebuild Lebanese infrastructures had already been spent, through United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in 2010. Precisely, some authors praise these signs of pragmatism such as the meeting between Foreign Affairs Minister Moratinos and Hezbollah’s leader Naim Qaseem in July 2007, a few days after the killing of six Spanish soldiers in Hezbollah’s stronghold.\(^{33}\) More recently, and due to the sensitivity for our contribution to UNIFIL, Spain’s attitude has continued to be exquisitely prudent, for example, when Spanish Ambassador in Beirut Juan Carlos Gafo Acevedo praised the fact that Hezbollah did not take part directly in the Adaisseh struggle, a key factor that avoided an even more dramatic ending than it really was.\(^{34}\)

By the end of 2012 the mission almost finished, according to U.N. sources, and Spain had already reduced its troops to 1,050, having used the military changeover to demobilize 200 soldiers in July, an officially justified process both due to the consolidation of mission objectives and the economic crisis that our country is suffering.\(^{35}\) Anyway, it is clear that not only Spain, but all the international community have left behind the letter and spirit of Resolution 1559, in which one of the main objectives in this Resolution was to disarm the Lebanese militias (read Hezbollah in Lebanon’s southern region) and to transfer effective control over the territory to Lebanon’s Armed Forces.
5. Conclusions

While Islamist terrorist attacks or terrorist attack attempts committed in Spain in the last three decades do not have Hezbollah’s clear mark at first sight, we can conclude that, regarding some of the terrorist attacks carried out in the 80s, Hezbollah’s influence is evident in attacks like the one at “El Descanso” restaurant. Anyway, this one was, we must remember, the deadliest terrorist attack committed by Lebanese people outside Lebanon. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s setting of Spanish targets beyond our national frontiers – diplomatic targets in the 80s, and more recently, military targets since we contributed to reinforce UNIFIL in 2006 – has increased Spanish vulnerabilities in relation to this terrorist group. On top of that, the increasing appeal of Spain for propaganda purposes, both from Hezbollah and Iran, is also a worrying issue: it links our object of study both to our dimension as EU member State –where there is not yet the necessary political will to call Hezbollah a terrorist group, but some member states have actually evaluated the damaging component of its propaganda (“Al-Manar” channel) – and that as the bridge to Latin America, where this group’s network is increasingly visible.

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Notes

1 Javier Martín’s work, Spanish Agencia de Noticias EFE’s journalist, expert in Middle East issues, *Hizbollah, el brazo armado de Dios*, Madrid, La Catarata, 2006 (2nd augmented edition, published 2011), is an interesting monographic study that has enriched Spanish-made analysis on this subject.

2 Next cited cases belong to the comprehensive compilation made by Raquel Fontecha in “Cronología de inciden-

3 The “Musa Sadr Brigades” organized a true terrorist offensive against Spain those days, seen on Lebanese soil as two consecutive kidnappings of the Spanish ambassador, Pedro de Arístegui; the second one involved the release of those arrested in our country as a condition to free the ambassador.

4 This terrorist organization seriously wounded a Lebanese citizen in Madrid on November 3.


6 According to Arístegui, a group like “Islamic Jihad” did not amount to much, but Hezbollah’s “cover”, used to avoid direct acknowledgement of some terrorist actions. See *La Yihad en España. La obsesión por reconquistar Al-Ándalus*, by G. Arístegui, Madrid, La Esfera de los Libros, 2005, pp. 162-468. The author clearly accuses Hezbollah of the attack on “El Descanso” in pages 167 and 168, as he does again in page 197.


10 Gustavo Daniel Perednik, Argentinian author, attributes both terrorist attacks to the Judeophobia he finds in his country, Argentina, in his work *La judeofobia. Cómo y cuándo nace, dónde y por qué pervive*, Barcelona Flor del Viento Ed., 2001, p. 198. While he does not attribute those attacks to any specific terrorist group, others have been talking about Hezbollah and even a State, Iran, but the lack of a strongly proved judicial verdict leaves all hypotheses unanswered.

11 Napoleoni places terrorists with very different origins, naming Hezbollah and ETA, at Ciudad del Este, a Para-
guayan town, close to Brazilian and Argentineine borders, and analyzes both groups’ use of the “revolutionary tax”. See L. Napoleoni: *Yihad. Cómo se financia el terrorismo en la nueva economía*, Barcelona, Urano, 2004. See about the presence of Hezbollah in South America, pp. 293 and 294, and on the “revolutionary tax”, page 298.


13 As Ignacio Cembrero details, digital mess governing Spain as the result of the presidency of José Luis Rodrí-
guez Zapatero has allowed the appearance of several DTTV channels, mainly “Córdoba TV”, funded by Saudi Arabia, and Iranian-funded “Hispan TV”. This one broadcasts as many as twelve daily news programs, made in Tehran, and as TV channel officials say, the recent, pressing EU embargo on Iranian regime is forcing this channel to further focus on its Latin American projection. See I. Cembrero: “El “hiyab” se cuela en la TDT”, *El País Digital*, 4 December 2012, on www.elpais.es.


15 Though people directly related to Hezbollah do appear on that List, the group has not been included as such. About the debate on this issue, see Emanuele Ottolenghi: *Hezbollah, the Party of Terror. Why it should be included in the EU terrorist list*, Friends of Israel Initiative Paper 8, 5 October 2012.

16 Although for authors like Stuart Reigeluth Hamas’s presence in that List and Hezbollah’s absence show what he denominates as EU foreign policy weakness in Eastern Mediterranean region, it is true that both cases are differ-
ent. Hamas entered that list on its own merits and after having helped to ruin (with terrorist attacks, be it suicide
attacks or not, made in the years when Palestinian Authority was negotiating with Israel and other regional actors) the Peace Process in Middle East and advocating the destruction of Israel, as opposed to the defenders of peace formulas for that region. Hezbollah’s political legitimization in Lebanon, added to the lack of definitive proofs of its involvement in terrorist acts, makes things difficult for people who wish that both groups be equally treated at the political arena. See Stuart Reigenluth: “Hamás y Hezbolá: Reflejo de la resistencia, retos para la democracia”, Revista CIDOB d’Affers Internacionals, 993-994, April 2011, pp. 154-155.


18 These three European countries responded to Israeli demand to deploy 5,000 troops before 15 September 2006 as a Support Force for UNIFIL in order to allow Israel Defense Force to retire from Lebanese territory. See “Un año más en la Línea Azul”, Revista Española de Defensa, September 2010, pp. 20-21.

19 Marisa Cruz: “Alonso modificará el decreto de medallas para conceder la más alta a los soldados del Líbano”, El Mundo, 3 July 2007, p. 10.


21 Some media has been echoing claims like those by “Fatah al-Islam”, a jihadist group then fighting Lebanese Armed Forces in the city of Tripoli, but doubts remain unsolved so far. See Jesús Rodríguez: “El hombre que lucha por la paz en Líbano”, El País Semanal, 20 February 2011, p. 39.

22 Although Javier Martín never blames Hezbollah by linking it to the terrorist attack on Spanish paratroopers, he does remember how the reinforced presence of UNIFIL altered the complete dominance in the “Muqawana” area, Hezbollah’s armed branch, disturbing with its presence this group’s reorganization after the attacks launched by Israel in the summer of 2006. See J. Martín: Suiñes y chiíes. Los dos brazos de Alá, Madrid, La Catarata, 2008, p. 317.


26 Such declarations were made a bit after UNIFIL troops had suffered some attacks at villages in the south of the country and Lebanese President Michel Suleyman asked “blue helmets” not to patrol inside towns. See Javier Espinosa: “Hizbulá amenaza con un conflicto si le acusan del asesinato de Hariri”, El Mundo, 24 July 2010, p. 27.

27 Declarations by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak after the incident warned about derived risks that France and U.S. kept providing sophisticated arms to the Lebanese Armed Forces, because they could be seized by Hezbollah. See Sibylle Rizk: “Israel calme le jeu avec Beyrouth après un accrochage meurtrier”, Le Figaro, 5 August 2010, p. 6.

28 His predecessor Mohammed Khatami had visited Lebanon in 2003, but he had not got that close to the Israeli border.

29 In the context of that visit, Hezbollah publicly said that it had received about $1 billion aid from Tehran during the four years elapsed since the beginning of the war against Israel. See J. Espinosa: “Un jardín iraní a la puerta de Israel”, El Mundo, 15 October 2010, p. 30.


31 UNIFIL command extension for a second year happened in the context of major insecurity, as Spanish Defense Minister confirmed. See R. Benito: “Chacón dice que el Líbano sigue siendo ‘un foco de inseguridad’”, El Mundo, 21 December 2010, p. 18.

32 Ana Carbajosa: “Hezbolá rompe el Gobierno libanés y abre una nueva etapa de inestabilidad”, El País, 13 January 2011, p. 3.

34 See depiction made by ambassador Juan Carlos Gafo Acevedo: “España y el Líbano: una presencia plural y comprometida” Tiempo de Paz #99, winter 2010, p. 87. For the Addaehh struggle, see S.Rizk: “Accrochage meurtrier à la frontière israëlo-libanaise”, Le Figaro, 4 August 2010, p. 5.