FRIENDS OF ISRAEL INITIATIVE

Why the Allen Plan is Detrimental to Israel's Future Security

OCTOBER 2017

Why the Allen Plan is Detrimental to Israel's Future Security

Table of Contents

The Allen Plan and Israel's Security

Introduction

During President Obama's Israel-Palestinian peace process in 2013-2014, US General John Allen produced a security plan to be implemented on the establishment of a Palestinian state. Although the plan remains classified and has not been made publically available, its contents have been detailed in a paper published by authors including Secretary of State John Kerry's chief of staff for Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations and General Allen's chief of staff in his work to develop the security plan.[1]

The Allen Plan remains the only comprehensive international security plan that has so far been drawn up to address Israel's security concerns in the context of a sovereign Palestinian state. Although it is an American plan, it was written in consultation with the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and was reportedly endorsed by some former senior IDF officers.

Although opinions have always been divided on its viability, the plan is believed to be again under consideration in connection with President Trump's efforts to secure a peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. The purpose of this paper is to set out our concerns over the Allen Plan and why we consider it should not be considered a viable replacement for existing Israeli and Palestinian Authority security arrangements in the Palestinian territories. The paper also sets out a range of issues that should be taken into account by leaders and officials in broader consideration of security in the Palestinian territories in connection with negotiations over any future Palestinian state.

The authors of the Allen Plan believed that it put forward a security system that would meet both parties' requirements, and that under its terms, security concerns need not stand in the way of a permanent status agreement. While we applaud General Allen's efforts to remove this fundamental obstacle to an agreement, we disagree with this assertion.

Our concerns over the plan fall into three categories. First, irrespective of the present or future intentions of Israel and the Palestinian leadership as far as peace and security is concerned, we believe instability across the region, and the unpredictability of the various entities who control states and military power, render any arrangement that places the West Bank beyond Israel's security control unwise and unsafe and would endanger the State of Israel.

---

[1] 'A Security System for the Two-State Solution', Center for a New American Security, May 2016.
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-2StateSolution-FINAL.pdf?mtime=20161004141032

Second, we are not convinced that any element of the present Palestinian leadership has a real desire to exist in peace alongside the Jewish state. Even if the Palestinian leadership for tactical purposes signed up to a peace deal and the security plan, we believe it is likely they would subsequently renege on the agreement. If we are wrong about this, we nevertheless remain concerned – as with the wider region – that the stability of any current or future Palestinian leadership is in doubt. There is a high likelihood that a regime that signs up to peace and the security plan could be overthrown either from within or from outside any future Palestinian state.

Third, we believe there are such major shortcomings with the Allen Plan's proposals to replace existing Israeli and Palestinian Authority security arrangements with security forces of a new state and international forces, in what must be assumed to be a non-benign environment, that they would carry unacceptable risks for the future of the State of Israel.

We therefore believe that implementation of this plan, or any variant of it, would place the State of Israel in existential danger. We also believe it would further undermine security and stability in the region as a whole, and potentially more widely, including in Europe. We set out the analysis that leads us to these conclusions in more detail below.

The Allen Plan

The Allen Plan proposes a system under which (a) a putative demilitarized Palestinian state could provide for its own internal security and (b) threats to Israel emanating from or through the territory of that state could be prevented. The two issues are overlapping. The plan includes security provision for sea and airports in a Palestinian state as well as a land corridor linking the two distinct areas of the state, ie the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The plan makes two fundamental proposals. First, that significant enhancements should be made to security from across the Palestinian state's border with Jordan, from the state into Israel and within the state itself using physical obstacles and technology. Second, that existing Israeli and Palestinian security forces operating in the West Bank should be replaced by substantially upgraded Palestinian state security forces and international forces, in particular US forces.

Under these proposals the US would provide a *permanent* force of 300-800 troops. Permanent meaning permanent, i.e. they would never be withdrawn. The US and other international forces would train, equip, evaluate and monitor Palestinian security forces. US forces would conduct limited operations along the Jordan valley. Provision would be made for coordination and intelligence sharing between Palestinians, US and Israeli forces, with US mediation. In addition, Palestinian state government arrangements for arrest, trial and detention of those who threatened security would be developed, with assistance and support from the US and the international community.

The strategic setting

Before turning to our concerns with the plan itself, we will first set out why we do not believe that in the current situation it would be feasible for the IDF to be denied freedom to operate along the Jordan valley and throughout the West Bank, which is a key requirement of the plan.

Israel's need for defensible borders was enshrined within UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 and has been endorsed by successive US administrations. After two invasions by conventional Arab forces, the Security Council recognized the serious ongoing threat to Israel from its neighbours in the region. After 1967 Israel endured two further wars of aggression against its territory, as well as aggression from Lebanese territory that resulted in two additional wars and from Gaza that resulted in three conflicts. In addition to these major conflagrations, Israel has suffered a long series of serious and sustained terrorist attacks that continue today

In fact, Israel has been under attack since the state was proclaimed in 1948 and the Jewish population in the land of Israel suffered frequent and sustained assault by Arabs for over 30 years before the creation of the state. It could be said that unlike any other country in the world, the State of Israel has not had to endure wars between periods of peace but has experienced periods of limited quiet during a long war against it with no end in sight.

This is exceptional and in these circumstances, Israel's security requirements must be seen as exceptional. The conflict is neither rational nor logical: rather than benefit those who attack Israel, it works against their own interests as well as Israel's. Israel's enemies have never won an armed conflict against Israel and know that they cannot ever win such a conflict, yet they continue their aggression. In this context a rational and logical security plan, which might well work effectively in many other situations cannot be assumed to apply to this situation.

We cannot be ruled by history, but it would be extremely unwise to ignore such a lengthy and unwavering history of aggression against Jews in the land of Israel, spanning 100 years in modern times. In the context of the Israel-Palestinian peace process, however, it has been assumed that the Palestinian side want to live in peace with the Jewish state just because they sometimes say they do, while ignoring a long historical track record, the fundamental tenets of their religion and culture and so many unmistakable and continuing signs to the contrary, some of which are considered below.

The threat today

The threat to Israel today is very different from that in 1967 or the decades that followed, but it is not reduced and in some ways it has increased. Today there is no appreciable threat from massed Arab armies. That does not mean such a threat could not arise again in the future. For example, Iraq's army is re-building and Syria, supported by Iran, could well reconstitute an Israel-facing conventional army after the situation there has stabilized.

But the major immediate threat today is of a different kind, sometimes termed hybrid warfare. In recent years we have seen technology enabling relatively small, non-state, non-attributable groups to act with the force of a state. We have seen this from Hamas in Gaza, from the Islamic State across the Middle East, from Hizballah, from Al Qaida, the Taliban and other jihadist groups in the Middle East, Asia and the wider world.

Conventional weapons, chemical weapons, terrorism and cyber warfare have been used by such groups. But the new range of threats is indirect as well as direct. Aggression is planned and implemented not just with physical violence in mind but incorporating sophisticated political warfare, such as exploitation of the media, human rights groups and international bodies to generate world condemnation, isolation and consequent serious economic and political damage.

Rapprochement with the Jewish state?

Despite peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt – which are not supported by the majority of their own populations – we cannot assume that the presence of the Jewish state will in the future be accepted by all of its neighbours or even that these peace agreements will endure into the future. It is of note that the population of Jordan, which benefits significantly from its relationship with Israel, is among the most virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Israel of any peoples in the world.

Today there is optimism about common cause between Israel and some of its Arab neighbours. There is increasing 'below the radar' cooperation between Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the UAE, and we have recently seen some encouraging public signs. For example, the King of Bahrain reportedly called on Arab states to end their boycott of Israel and there are reports even of the possible normalization of relations between the two countries in the near future. A cordial and very public meeting between the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel also occurred in the margins of the September 2017 United Nations General Assembly.

We hope that all of this signifies a genuine shift in Arab countries' attitude to Israel. But we remain cautious that it indicates a permanent ideological shift. We believe it could instead represent merely tactical and transitory interests in the face of Iranian aggression amid concerns about US commitment to its allies in the region stemming from President Obama's policies. While we can be hopeful this will lead to genuine change, and must do whatever we can to encourage it, we do not believe such hope should form the basis of security strategy and especially not the kind of far-reaching risks to Israel's future that are envisaged under the Allen Plan.

Regional instability

Our concerns in this context are heightened by continuing and unpredictable instability across the Middle East. The upheaval created by the so-called Arab Spring is not over and the potential for overthrow of existing regimes – including those that may now appear inclined towards some form of rapprochement with Israel – remains, despite a more supportive US policy towards its allies in the region.

The Islamic State (ISIS) is on the decline in both Syria and Iraq but it is far from finished and the threat it poses in the region is evolving and unpredictable. The same is true of Al Qaida and other Sunni jihadists, whose fortunes show signs of reviving in line with setbacks to ISIS.

We are witnessing ongoing jihadist infiltration and aggression against Egypt including in Sinai. The potential threat to Arab states from Sunni jihadism, in terms of insurrection, terrorism, infiltration and even overthrow of governments contributes to the unpredictability of regional states and their future attitudes to Israel.

Iran

Iran poses a further serious threat to the stability of states across the region. We have seen the control it has gained in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. It is fuelling conflict in Yemen to gain control there and to destabilize neighboring Saudi Arabia.

Iran constitutes the greatest single threat to the State of Israel, both directly and by proxy. Of particular relevance to security in the West Bank, as part of its plan to encircle Israel it has its sights set on Jordan. The Jordanian government has expressed this concern and Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC Quds Force, made it clear in 2015 that Jordan was prominent on Iran's target list.

One of the reasons that Jordan has remained stable is the presence of Israel along the Jordan valley as well as close coordination of other IDF and intelligence assets with Jordan. The removal of the IDF, as envisaged in the Allen Plan, would likely embolden Iran and others to destabilize the country. This would have far-reaching consequences for Israel's security as well as potentially Egypt's and for the wider world.

 Through Hizballah Iran has deployed 100,000 rockets in Lebanon capable of reaching the far extremities of Israel. Iran is at present trying to build bases of attack against Israel from Syria and to ship advanced weapon systems into both Lebanon and Syria for use against Israel, including chemical weapons.

Iran has for many years supported and armed anti-Israel forces in Gaza including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and has directed and encouraged these groups to attack Israel. At times when their will has been flagging, Iran has sent Hizballah emissaries to stiffen their resolve.

Iran has similar intentions for the West Bank. In 2014 the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamanei, declared his vision to 'turn the West Bank into the next Gaza', ie a base from which to attack Israel. Hamas could readily be harnessed by Iran to destabilize both the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Jordan, and with Iranian backing, has the capability to do either. Among the far-reaching consequences of the destabilization of Jordan would be establishing a base from which munitions could be brought into the West Bank for use against Israel.

Iran's nuclear programme remains and has in effect been facilitated by President Obama's nuclear deal in both development of weapons and missiles. The deal also provides funding for Iran's region-wide imperialist aggression. The nuclear programme will continue unless it can be halted by punitive economic action, regime change or military strike.

We are concerned not just by Iran's future capability to deliver nuclear warheads launched on long-range ballistic missiles. Iran is highly adept at using terror proxies around the world and has done so in the Middle East, Europe and Latin America. In the future it is likely to be capable of arming proxies with portable nuclear or radiological weapons for use against its enemies.

Recognising this nuclear threat from Iran in all its guises is fundamental to the issue of West Bank security as well as to many other strategic considerations. A nuclear armed Iran would change all of the dynamics in the Middle East affecting Israel's security including, critically, freedom of action of US and other international forces deployed to implement the provisions of the Allen Plan. Bluntly put, a nuclear-armed Iran alone renders the Allen Plan unworkable.

This is the unpredictable strategic context in which security of the West Bank must be considered. The Allen Plan purports to allow for future regional uncertainty. But in any circumstances in which Arab states become further destabilized, or regime change re-orientates them against Israel, or Iran continues on its current trajectory both in nuclear and non-nuclear terms, the plan will simply fail.

The Palestinians

Turning now to the Palestinians themselves. As with all of their neighbours, including Egypt and Jordan, hatred and rejection of the Jewish state remains endemic among the Palestinian population. It has long been ingrained into their people. It is maintained, and operationalized into violent attacks, by public speeches, mosque preaching, school teaching, textbooks, maps, TV programmes, newspapers and Internet propaganda.

Financial incentives to violence and murder are provided by Palestinian authorities through salaries for convicted terrorists and rewards for the families of terrorists killed attacking Israel. Encouragement to violence is also given by honoring terrorists – including naming public places, competitions and sports teams for them.

In this way generation after generation has been taught to hate Israel and its Jewish population. It continues today with no sign of abatement. The way in which their children are educated is a far more reliable measure of the Palestinians' real attitude to peace with their neighbours than polling or conciliatory statements and messages delivered by their leaders for Western consumption.

Successive Palestinian leaders have consistently rejected all offers of peace including offers made by Israel via US brokers which amounted to the maximum concessions that could be expected in any realistic settlement. Contravening the Oslo accords they have sought and in some cases secured bilateral membership agreements with international organizations in advance of any settlement. Through manipulation of international bodies such as UNESCO, they have sought to distort and deny Israel's historic legacy and rights to any of its land. All of this also indicates an unwillingness to work towards or genuinely believe in any negotiated peace.

It is the Palestinians who stand to gain by far the most from a peace settlement yet they have consistently refused to make any compromises for peace. Instead they have demanded more and more from Israel and from the international community and returned only violence, instigation of anti-Israel hatred among their own people and around the world and encouragement of anti-Israel boycotts, divestment and sanctions and anti-Israel actions in world bodies such as UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council and Security Council.

It is worth considering why, despite all that Westerners perceive the Palestinians could gain from a settlement, they have continually rejected it. To understand this we have to understand Muslim Palestinian religion and culture, which permeates and dominates their thinking in a way that is hard for Westerners to comprehend.

No Muslim leader can sign a permanent peace treaty with non-Muslims – just temporary ceasefires for tactical gain. This is especially true over land once conquered by Islam, which under Sharia must remain Muslim land forever. That is the case for all land in Judea and Samaria, including what are now Jewish 'settlements'. It is also the case for all other parts of Israel.

PLO leader Yasser Arafat would not accept the generous terms offered by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David in 2000. He was quoted as saying that he rejected the offer because he did not want to end up drinking tea with Anwar Sadat – the Egyptian President who was the first Arab leader to sign a peace agreement with Israel and paid for it with his life.

Likewise, President Mahmud Abbas cannot sign a permanent peace agreement with Israel, cannot make concessions to Israel and cannot recognize the Jewish state however much he might be pressured or incentivized by the West. No leader in either the West Bank or Gaza is authorized to end the conflict with Israel. This will also be true of Abbas's successors who will also understand that their signature on such an agreement will also be the signature on their death warrant.

Even if it were possible for the leader of the ruling West Bank Fatah party to agree to peace with Israel, there would be a high likelihood not only of their assassination but also of revolt inside the party and among its supporters. This would inevitably lead to violent challenge within the party against concessions offered to Israel.

The constitutions of Both Fatah and Hamas – with varying degrees of explicitness – reject the Jewish state. The long-term conflict between Fatah and Hamas, and other Palestinian elements, does not auger well for any sustainable adherence to peace in the West Bank or Gaza either between Palestinians or with Israel.

There have been discussions and agreements between Hamas and Fatah on future cooperation including in recent weeks. While this possibility – should it materialize – may be seen as having some positives, it also has significant negatives, including the potential alliance between the supposed 'partner for peace', Fatah, and a party that is overtly dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state and committed to armed violence to bring it about.

This paper is not about whether or not it is possible to achieve a final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians leading to the creation of a Palestinian state. But the foregoing analysis of the Palestinians' attitude to a peace agreement must be considered in assessing whether or not a security plan can be successfully implemented. Commitment to such a plan followed by its abandonment forced by Palestinian recidivism would be immensely damaging for the US but especially for Israel.

The Allen Plan envisages a transitional period during which new security arrangements would be put in place, but begins with a heavily front-loaded withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the West Bank. Should the Palestinians renege on any agreement – which frankly seems likely based on previous behavior and all current indicators – it would be necessary to reverse such withdrawals in a way that would undoubtedly see the blame shifted onto Israel. This is considered further below.

The Allen Plan: physical and technical template

The physical and technical proposals of the Allen Plan, which in themselves are reasonable and logical, amount to a template that, with variations, could be applied to border security in virtually any high risk area. Sophisticated measures are proposed, which would no doubt be capable of further enhancement in the future as technology advances, making them even more effective than currently conceived.

But just as defensive technologies improve, so do technologies and ingenuity to counter them. As an enemy gains knowledge and understanding of physical and technical security measures he can work out ways to overcome them. This has been true throughout history and will always be true however far technology advances.

No matter how attractive technological solutions may appear to be in dealing with security challenges, they cannot provide the complete answer, and are not seen as doing so anywhere in the world or in any realistic future scenario, including for the US's own security in critical areas.

Such solutions must always be augmented and reinforced by actual security forces – by boots on the ground. These forces can create surprise and unpredictability; and can vary patterns, routines and deployments. Security forces can both deter enemy action and destroy enemy aggression.

A similar principle applies to intelligence. Technical intelligence can be highly effective and again will improve as technology develops. But it can never provide the complete picture, and rarely generates sufficient operational information to target timely and precise intervention against enemy action. For that, human intelligence sources and human surveillance are usually necessary to augment technical assets. We have seen this time and again in all modern theatres of operations including Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. Intelligence implications are considered further below.

The Allen physical and technological template can only be seen as a tool to be used to obstruct, identify and monitor munitions movements and construction, attack and penetration attempts; to trigger response; to protect and to enable more efficient use of security forces. It will work in the West Bank, as in other places, but as an adjunct only. We will not, therefore, further consider the physical/technological template applied under the Allen Plan, focusing instead on the security forces that must be deployed as the critical component of defence.

Security forces: the critical component

There are currently three predominant threats to Israel from within an independent Palestinian state. First, the threat from the Palestinian authorities themselves, from whatever government or governments have sovereignty over the territories. At present Fatah control the West Bank and Hamas control Gaza. In the future we could see one replacing the other in each area, a coalition or merger of the two or the emergence of one or more new parties/groups.

How any of these combinations might emerge, or what their attitude might be towards Israel, cannot be predicted. But we must assume the worst case, in other words that the authority or authorities governing the territories, or significant elements within them, remain hostile towards Israel.

Second, the threat from other individuals or groups within the territories. For example, while Gaza today is controlled by Hamas, other entities, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) often launch attacks against Israel, whether or not sanctioned or directed by Hamas.

Third, the threat from external elements. In the future we could see infiltration or take-over of the territories or areas within them. For example, we have seen this in Syria, Iraq and Sinai by the Islamic State and other jihadists, in Lebanon by Hizballah and in Yemen by Houthi militias. Any of these three threat categories could be supported by one or more states hostile to Israel. We do not know how the dynamics, governance and geopolitics will unfold in future in an unstable, turbulent and unpredictable Middle East. At present, Iran is the most prominent state aggressor against Israel. Iranian proxies are active in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon (and elsewhere). Iran has sponsored and directed aggression against Israel by various groups including Hizballah, Hamas and PIJ.

To counter these threats, in addition to physical barriers and technical solutions, it is clear that security forces must be deployed along the Jordan valley and throughout the depth of the West Bank. The Allen Report recognizes the need for non-Palestinian forces to operate along the Jordan valley, and provides for limited US forces to do this on a permanent basis. But to secure the Jordan valley any security force also needs to operate along the mountain ridge further west. Without doing so, forces along the Jordan valley would lack tactical depth and be unable to defend themselves from attack, including potentially from conventional attack.

As we have also seen in the much smaller Gaza Strip, even when border security control is tight, ways can be found to infiltrate munitions or the wherewithal to manufacture munitions. Advancing technology and human ingenuity will likely find ways of achieving this even more effectively in the future, and so a capability of operating throughout the depth of the West Bank is required. For reasons discussed below, just as the Allen Plan recognizes the need for non-Palestinian forces along the Jordan valley, there is a need for non- Palestinian forces to operate both along the mountain ridge to its west and further inside the territory of the West Bank.

Intelligence

Under the type of hybrid threat that Israel faces today and will face in the future, intelligence is as important as ever but more difficult to collect than in conventional conflicts, given the covert nature and sophistication of the enemy.

Israel has decades of experience in collecting intelligence against all targets that threaten it. This capability does not simply refer to the West Bank but also to intelligence collection over the horizon, i.e. in Jordan and Syria.

Continuity is vital and Israel is able to dedicate operatives to these roles for longer periods than is likely to be possible for any foreign forces. Israel has developed a level of fusion and rapid dissemination that can enable reaction times to be measured in minutes. This has in the past and will in the future constitute the difference between successful prevention and a failure with catastrophic consequences in human and political terms.

The ability to translate intelligence into military action on the ground or in the air is enhanced by the deep familiarity of IDF forces with the terrain and the population as well as the highly developed interaction between intelligence services and reaction forces. This may seem like a detail that could be overcome, but that is unlikely to be possible with foreign forces undergoing frequent rotation, and – with the best will in the world – lacking the motivation of national self-preservation that drives the Israeli intelligence effort.

Israel's capabilities could not be maintained at anything like current levels in the event of IDF withdrawal from the West Bank and neither could they be replaced or replicated by the intelligence efforts of Palestinian authorities or international forces.

Even US forces, which are highly proficient and capable in terms of intelligence collection, could never hope to equal the capabilities of Israeli intelligence in the West Bank, Jordan and Syria, and would be further constrained by language barriers, culture differences, constitutional restrictions and bureaucratic and legal procedures.

The reaction to whatever intelligence capability Israel was able to maintain following withdrawal would be constrained by a dissemination and decision-making process that would necessarily be more elongated and disjointed than now. It would also be hampered by language difficulties and in some cases by source and capability protection considerations.

Palestinian security forces

The strong IDF presence in the West Bank, backed by a powerful intelligence capability, including along the Jordan valley (100,000 men with considerable reinforcement capability) significantly deters current threats and is capable of preventing or destroying infiltration and take-over. Internally, in many areas existing Palestinian security forces play a significant role, which is to a very large extent enabled and encouraged by the IDF presence on the ground and by mutual cooperation.

Palestinian security forces in an independent state could not be counted upon to achieve the current joint effect, in terms of either capability or intent. The Allen Plan confidently asserts that the US, aided by allies, will equip and train Palestinian security forces to the required levels of capability.

This was also the plan for Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen. Yet despite billions of dollars of expenditure and years of training by US, British and allied forces, the Afghan, Iraqi and Yemeni security forces have all been unable to withstand aggression from respectively Islamic State, Taliban, Al Qaida, Iran-backed Houthis and other militias.

In the case of Iraq, the security forces have only been able to make gains against ISIS with strong international leadership and support. In the case of Afghanistan President Trump has had to reinforce the mentoring and training effort for Afghan security forces after *15 years* of substantial investment in training, mentoring and equipping them. Part of the problem has been with incompetent and corrupt national governance. But is it realistic to assume that these same characteristics will not apply to a future Palestinian government?

International forces

International forces engaged in peace support operations, such as envisaged in a future Palestinian state, have always proved themselves to be *incapable* of maintaining their mandate when faced with either significant threats or at least one party to a conflict failing to adhere to its obligations under a peace or ceasefire agreement. They have *never* succeeded in such circumstances.

In Lebanon we can see for ourselves the long-term failure of UN Security Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping missions, US pressure, international condemnation and international support for the government. International guarantees of demilitarization have led to ever-growing militarization including the 100,000 rockets that threaten Israel today. Deliberately embedded among civilian populations, the only way to counter these weapons if they are used will lead to civilian deaths in their thousands.

Unlike international forces backed by UN resolutions and international guarantees, the IDF, like any military force closely defending its own land and people, will take risks and make major sacrifices including if necessary sustaining heavy casualties and will act in whatever way is necessary within international and domestic law to deal with threats, unconstrained by international mandates and national caveats.

There is no doubt about the readiness of US forces to make similar sacrifices, as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, in both cases they have been fighting an American war to defend the American people against a strategic threat directed against the US.

This is not the case with the West Bank where the dynamics are very different. US forces would not be defending against threats directed at the US; instead they would be – and would be seen to be – protecting the State of Israel. We cannot foresee the attitude of a future US Administration or the American people to such a situation. Without criticizing, we must consider, for example, the case of Beirut in 1983, when US peacekeeping forces were withdrawn after sustaining heavy casualties in an Iran-inspired bomb attack; and the case of Iraq in 2012 when all US forces were precipitately withdrawn for domestic electoral reasons.

International peacekeeping forces operate in a completely different way and with different imperatives from national security forces defending their own terrain and people as alluded to above. They are far more likely to operate with greater aversion to risk and greater caution, constraints that render them less effective or even ineffective in countering a force that is intent on undermining them or the agreements they are there to maintain.

The Allen Report contends that US forces would be the only international forces acceptable to both the Israeli and Palestinian side. That may be true in terms of trust and confidence, although this too is in doubt as we consider below. But it does not overcome the concerns we have expressed above about the nature of peacekeeping forces, nor the potential damage to relations between the State of Israel and its US allies, which we also discuss below.

From the Palestinian perspective, it is unlikely to be long before the 'honeymoon' period came to an end, as we quickly saw after the initial euphoria that met US forces' arrival in Iraq in 2003. In the West Bank, as soon as US forces began to operate effectively against Palestinian activity that threatened Israel they would inevitably be seen as the agents of Israel, occupying forces undermining Palestinian sovereignty. The consequences can be readily predicted based on knowledge of the Palestinians' attitude as well as numerous historical precedents.

Attacks against US forces

We must assume that at some point the *permanent* US presence would come under direct attack. This could be by a Palestinian faction who considered their sovereignty to be undermined

by the presence of foreign forces or for a variety of other reasons. Alternatively, it could be by, or directed by, external actors such as Iran.

In the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, Iranian proxies attacked US forces with Iranian-supplied weapons, killing well over 1,000 American soldiers. In any such scenario, irrespective of the aggressors, the origin of attacks could be concealed to make attribution, retaliation and prevention more difficult, as they often were in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It would be entirely unrealistic to assert reliance upon the political will of a future US Administration, in unpredictable circumstances, to maintain forces in the country on a permanent basis – as envisaged by the plan – especially in the face of heavy casualties. The same of course does not apply to Israel because, as mentioned earlier, its forces will if necessary sustain heavy casualties and undergo vicious attacks in defence of their own people.

Furthermore, Israel should be concerned about how American casualties might affect the relationship with the US, its most vital ally anywhere in the world. It should not be expected to put that relationship in jeopardy in this way. Again, we must look at this from a worst-case perspective. Heavy casualties would hopefully not be sustained by US forces operating there, but it is a possibility that cannot simply be ignored or skirted around.

Another worst-case scenario, which might now appear to be a detail but in future could have strategic consequences, might occur if the IDF is forced to intervene while US forces are in place. Irrespective of the most careful procedures, the most sophisticated technology and the utmost caution, in war friendly fire always occurs and always causes casualties – and will always do so, despite future technological advances.

We have seen it between US forces and their allies in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere and we have seen it between Israeli forces in Gaza. Should one or more such incidents occur, with IDF soldiers or warplanes inadvertently killing US troops, especially in large numbers, there could be immense damage to the relationship between the two countries.

A further consideration in this context is the obvious caution that the IDF would need to apply if it had to intervene in a zone with US or other international forces in place. Not only would this restrict operational freedom, it would also likely cause time delay. Either could have potentially far-reaching consequences for the success of an intervention, including loss of life.

IDF re-entry into the West Bank

If in unpredictable future circumstances, the Allen Plan arrangements ended and US forces were withdrawn by their government while Israel was still threatened, the IDF would have no option but to re-enter the Palestinian state either immediately or after a period. The Allen Plan also envisages such an incursion if Israel deemed it necessary, including while US forces remained in situ.

The plan recognizes that the Palestinians would never agree to an Israeli right to re-entry and suggests a side agreement between Israel and the US on the conditions under which the US would provide diplomatic cover for Israeli unilateral action. Again, the reaction and assessment of any future US administration cannot be predicted. The circumstances that led Israel to re-engage are most likely to be deliberately obfuscated and confused by an aggressor. This would

further complicate the respective assessments of Israel and the US as to the necessity of intervention, and therefore whether or not the US gave Israel its support.

We have seen frequently the international outrage and condemnation of Israel when it has been forced in the past to make such incursions into Lebanon and Gaza, territories from which it unilaterally withdrew to acclaim by the international community.

In the event of an incursion into a sovereign Palestinian state we must expect Israel to be universally condemned by Arab countries, by the UN, the EU, China, Russia and perhaps, as in the past, the US. Also as in the past we should expect protracted and highly publicized investigations leading inevitably to determinations against Israel of war crimes and crimes against humanity. All of this would be hugely damaging to the State of Israel in the long term, including to its economy.

Even though Israel's justification for military action in the past has been clear, such as three incursions into Gaza since 2008 to stop intensive rocket fire against its civilian population, we have nevertheless seen strong and sustained international condemnation of its actions.

Today, three years after the most recent defensive incursion into Gaza, false allegations of war crimes and unnecessary slaughter of civilians are constantly used to incite anti-Israel and anti-Semitic hatred around the world, to justify boycott, divestment and sanctions campaigns, and to incite violence and support for international terrorism.

Each of the three Gaza interventions resulted from aggression by Israel's enemies with the intention not of seriously damaging Israel, or defeating its army, but of provoking a response that would lead to the deaths of its own people in Gaza. The purpose was political warfare: to cause international outrage and inflict severe damage on Israel's reputation.

In the future, we must assume that Israel's enemies that provoke a defensive intervention into the Palestinian state will act with even greater guile and subterfuge, compelling Israel to act but appearing to the world as though Israel was the unprovoked aggressor. We should also expect to see a continuation of the well-proven human shield techniques as used extensively in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere, whereby Western armies are lured to kill innocent civilians for propaganda purposes, resulting inevitably in even greater condemnation and isolation.

Before the IDF withdrew from Gaza it was able to deal with threats and aggression, eg bomb factories or rocket launchers, with limited military operations such as deployment of patrols to eliminate the threat. Since withdrawing, threats must be dealt with either by warning air or artillery strikes or, when they fail, sustained air campaigns and full-scale air and ground intervention.

Inevitably this causes far greater casualties on both sides. The same applies in the West Bank. Today Israel conducts frequent, low-level operations against threats and attacks. These might result in local protest and sometimes relatively minor violence. Following withdrawal, we are likely to see re-runs of Gaza-scale interventions. In effect Israel would have to conduct war-fighting operations rather than police action.

Deterrence

Deterrence in a situation of potential conflict is always preferable to reacting to unfolding aggression. The immediate presence of the IDF in the West Bank frequently acts as a deterrent both to those within the territory and external actors who wish to use it as a base to attack Israel.

Although Israel would maintain the capability to react to such threats, its withdrawal would undermine the deterrent value of its active presence and – at least in the eyes of a potential aggressor – would likely raise the threshold for reaction against them. Even though replaced by US forces and supposedly more capable Palestinian security forces, deterrence would be reduced and the potential for conflict increased.

Wider implications

We have mentioned our concern about the stability of Jordan if the IDF is withdrawn from the Jordan valley. This is not a mere theory. The reality is that Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, under US and international pressure, not only further endangered Israel but also undermined Egypt's internal security, allowing movement of insurgents from Gaza into Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula. Similar consequences could well arise for Jordan if the IDF withdrew from the West Bank.

Concerns about Jordan apply in both directions – from Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and from an independent Palestinian state. As with the threat to Israel from this state, a threat against Jordan could arise from Palestinian claims to Jordan from a West Bank Palestinian state and from external forces operating inside the state.

Not only would a destabilized Jordan cause shock-waves across the Middle East as well as threatening Israel itself, but would almost certainly lead to a flow of refugees into Europe. Israel's support for both Egypt and Jordan has so far prevented a large-scale migration from the eastern Mediterranean into Europe, to add to the already unmanageable problems caused there by migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Africa and elsewhere.

The future potential for chaos in the West Bank and Jordan arising from Israel's withdrawal could also create another terror state or ungoverned territory from which not only Israel and other targets in the Middle East might be attacked, but also the West.

Israel remains the West's most important and most reliable ally in the Middle East. It is no less than a bulwark of stability and security in an otherwise unstable and insecure region. As we have explained above we believe that implementation of the Allen Plan would weaken Israel's security, perhaps catastrophically.

This in turn would encourage and embolden Israel's and the West's enemies in the region, most notably Iran. At a time when the US and its Western allies must confront the threats from Iran, and also seek to stabilize the region as far as possible, any weakening of Israel's position could cause major damage to the West as well as the Middle East.

Fundamental prospects for peace

As we discussed earlier, to properly gauge the prospects for a US-sponsored peace agreement it is necessary to understand the Palestinian cultural and religious perspective. In the Islamic mindset, no-one withdraws from territory they won or hold unless they are unable to maintain control of it. Magnanimity as we understand it in the West is a concept understood by Muslims as a weakness. Thus any Israeli withdrawal from territory would be seen as a demonstration of weakness. This is the way the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza was seen, and not as a concession for peace that should be respected and even reciprocated.

Israel and the US are both non-Muslim entities. In the Muslim mind, every struggle is by Muslims against non-Muslims. A hadith (a saying attributed to the Muslim prophet Muhammad) says non-believers are one nation. That means that Israel and the US are allies. Nothing can change this Muslim mindset, no matter how much we in the West might wish our powers of persuasion and diplomacy would do so.

This means that under the Allen Plan, the Palestinians would always see the US as biased towards Israel, no matter how much the Americans might protest otherwise and despite General Allen's own assertions to the contrary. In addition, if the US pressures Israel to surrender territory to the Palestinians, it would show America to be an unreliable ally, not to be trusted. For these reasons, from the Palestinian point of view, an American-imposed agreement *fundamentally* cannot work, irrespective of all the details General Allen has worked out, and the undoubtedly sincere intentions of the US towards peace. It is these ingrained cultural and religious tenets that would need to be overcome, not the provision of incentives or benefits arising from a peace agreement.

Conclusions and recommendations

For all of the reasons we set out above we would counsel against considering the Allen Plan as a means of overcoming the security obstacle to a final settlement. Nor would we support any alternative plan that contemplated the complete withdrawal of the IDF from the West Bank or constrained its freedom to operate there. As we have explained we believe this would jeopardize the existence of the state of Israel, could lead to the creation of another terror state in the Middle East and would have further serious detrimental implications for regional stability and wider security beyond the Middle East.

In effect, the Allen Plan surrenders – or at least undermines – Israel's sovereign right to defend its territory and people, outsourcing that responsibility to the United States, other international forces and the Palestinians. This is not even in exchange for full sovereignty for a Palestinian state, which would be exchanging Israeli military presence for US military presence, albeit envisaged on a more limited basis.

The plan requires Israel to make a number of concessions including handing over security control of the West Bank, extracting Jewish communities from the territories and taking risks on its own national security. It requires zero concessions from the Palestinian side.

We believe that any successful plan must be based above all on Palestinian concessions. It is the Palestinians who have most to gain from a final settlement and they should be required to

demonstrate that they are willing to make substantial efforts to that end. Without concessions there can be no certainty that the Palestinian leadership or people will have the full commitment necessary to ensure this new situation succeeds and endures and to justify the security risks it presents to Israel and more broadly.

We therefore recommend that a full demonstration of Palestinian commitment to a two-state solution and to ending aggression against Israel should be a pre-requisite to any Israeli concessions on security. An important start-point for this would be an end to PA-sponsored incitement to hate, including termination of all of the anti-Israel measures we detail above.
In the meantime, it may be possible for Israel to adjust its security profile in the West Bank, but that is a matter that the Israeli government would have to determine itself and in a way that would be reversible. The government might for example conclude that some adjustment would be possible if the physical/technological elements of the Allen Plan were implemented in whole or in part.

We believe that the attitude of the UN, the EU and the wider international community is partly responsible for current Palestinian intransigence and failure to make concessions for peace and security. We therefore urge international leaders to adopt an approach to the Palestinians that ceases to encourage their aggression against Israel. This includes funding of salaries for terrorists and funding of other activities that incite hatred such as schoolbooks and TV programmes. It also includes tolerating bilateral Palestinian membership of international bodies contrary to the Oslo accords.

Equally the international community's attitude towards Israel helps encourage conflict. National and international leaders' out of hand condemnation of Israeli military action in defence of its people should be ended. When Israel's enemies use human shields and Israel is obliged, despite many precautions, to kill civilians in order to protect its own people, international leaders' automatic condemnation of Israel's actions encourages the further use of human shields as this policy is rewarded and seen to succeed.

The same condemnation frequently occurs whenever Israel is forced into any form of military action. How could Israel be expected to accept the terms of the Allen Plan, including its provisions for potential incursions back into the West bank, when it knows that such action would inevitably result in international condemnation and all the subsequent investigations and harm that we mention above? Thus we believe the international community bears some responsibility for the current unsatisfactory situation, and along with the Palestinians, must make significant changes to become part of the solution.

Not only does the international community's attitude towards Israeli military defensive action itself encourage conflict, Israel is also often treated unfairly in the diplomatic arena, which again encourages wider hostility towards Israel and undermines Israel's own confidence in the support it might receive among the international community. For example, unlike every other UN member state, Israel has never been allowed to join the UN Security Council.

Also, even though it has never been disputed that West Jerusalem is and will remain sovereign Israeli territory, Western nations refuse to recognize Israel's capital and locate their embassies there. Again this is unique anywhere in the world, indicates discrimination and leads to distrust. Many Western governments and international bodies assert unequivocally that Jewish so-called 'settlements' in the West Bank are illegal and that the West Bank is illegally occupied, when in fact there is no basis for this in international law, the reality being that the West Bank is disputed territory not another state's sovereign territory.

We would urge consideration of the above recommendations, which would amount to a lengthy process, so that in time it might be possible to contemplate a situation where the IDF could consider ending its military presence in the West Bank. But this would also, in our view, be conditional upon much greater regional stability, which is not immediately on the horizon, and a much clearer indication of Israel's neighbors' long-term attitudes towards the Jewish state. This would include Iran's military capabilities and stance towards Israel.

General Allen's Plan: A Strategic, Political and Cultural Critique

The General Allen's plan was worked out during former Secretary of State John Kerry's attempt to solve the conflict that came to a halt in March 2014. According to press reports the plan was almost completed and enjoyed considerable support from the IDF officers who were engaging the American team that was working on it, but it was rejected categorically by the Israeli political leadership including the Defense Minister at the time, General Yaalon, and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Though the plan was never published, its key points were part of the security component of Secretary Kerry's six principles for promoting peace that he has set forth before leaving office (December 2016)[2]. A much more detailed version of the plan has been given publicity in a paper titled "A Security System for the Two-State Solution" that was published by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)[3]. One of the authors of the paper was Colonel Kris Bauman, who was General Allen's right hand while he was working on the security plan and is now head of the Israel desk at the National Security Council in the Trump administration. The other authors are Major General (Res.) Gadi Shamni from Israel, Mr. Ilan Goldenberg from CNAS, and Dr. Nimrod Novik, an Israeli scholar and entrepreneur, who was close to Shimon Peres.

This paper analyzes General Allen's plan as it is reflected in the CNAS paper and briefly attempts to propose a different approach to the security aspect of the peace process and a possible peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. A comprehensive view of Israel's security requirements in a peace with the Palestinians appear in a book under this name published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs in 2014[4].

The CNAS paper describes a proposed end-state security system based on two states where the independent Palestinian state is fully responsible for the security in the West Bank (and hopefully in the future, in Gaza as well), so that the Palestinians wouldn't have to see any IDF soldiers or Jewish settlers in their lands. Its key principles are:

1. Build a multilayered system that addresses Israel's security concerns in which Israel retains the right of self-defense as well as the capacity to defend itself by itself, but ensures this is only necessary in extremis.

---

[2] For the full transcript of Kerry's speech see: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.761881.
Kerry's six points also appear at Annex A of this paper.
[3] For the full paper by CNAS see: https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNASReport-2StateSolution-FINAL.pdf?mtime=20161004141032.
[4] For the full paper by the JCPA see: http://jcpa.org/pdf/DB_web.pdf.

2. Minimize Israeli visibility to Palestinian civilians and pursue significant early steps that signal a fundamental change on the ground to Palestinians.

3. Plan a conditions-based, performance-dependent area-by-area phased redeployment of Israeli security forces with target timetables, benchmarks, and an effective remediation process.

4. Conduct significant upgrades to security systems and infrastructure.

5. Build joint operations centers and data sharing mechanisms for all parties such that there is maximum situational awareness of the security environment for Israelis but minimal intrusion on Palestinian sovereignty.

6. Employ American forces for training, equipping, evaluating, and monitoring, and for conducting highly limited operations along the Jordan River.

Along 65 pages these principles are presented in what aspires to be a detailed manner, but much of it is technical tautologies and the details of a real plan – even along these guidelines – would still have to be worked out, bearing in mind that "the devil is in the details".

The CNAS paper adopts an extremely problematic approach to security on the political and strategic levels and has many pitfalls when it comes to the operational and tactical levels.

The main problems of the plan on the political and strategic levels are:

1. Lack of reference to the real main obstacle to peace, which is the Palestinian narrative that denies the existence of a Jewish people and the right of the Jews to have a state of their own on any grain of soil of mandatory Palestine and the difficulty of trusting them after 24 years of deceit and terror.

   As long as this narrative, which justifies an ongoing struggle to liberate Palestine by the Palestinian people, does not change, it is going to be impossible for the Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) to act effectively against those Palestinian individuals and organizations who will attempt to keep fighting against the existence of a Jewish state.

   The plan doesn't take any notice of the well-known repeated references of Palestinian leaders to the "Phases Theory" that looks at a future Palestinian state along the '67 lines as only the first stage to be followed by the effort to reach the ultimate goal of liberating all of Palestine.

   The plan assumes right from the beginning that the eastern border of the Palestinian state will be the Jordan river, totally ignoring other options.

2. The plan ignores the inherent weakness of the Palestinian entity. It refers to it as if it is a Western European country with reliable institutions and rule of law, whereas in fact the Palestinians have totally failed in the long-lasting test they were involved in ever since the beginning of the implementation of the Oslo accords. The PASF cannot govern effectively, even though they are well equipped and trained. They already lost Gaza to Hamas ten years ago, and without Israeli presence in the West Bank, regardless of how well trained they are going to be, they will face sever difficulties in exerting their control over problematic areas. Today, for example, with well-trained forces and with Israeli presence they still cannot enter several refugee camps. And there is no doubt such challenges will exist since an agreement cannot be reached without the leadership

denouncing the idea of liberating the rest of Palestine, but the public – to a large extent, and especially the residents of the refugee camps – is against this change in the narrative, which is continuously promoted by the same leadership for so many years. On top of that, corruption is so deeply rooted in the society and internal strife is so dominant in it that for any practical purpose any Palestinian entity has a very high probability of becoming a failed entity. The paper is trying to convince us that if the PASF get a certain level of training that makes it technically able to conduct some security activities, then the problem may be considered solved. This is extremely naïve and irresponsible. The test for the PASF should not be about capabilities but about real performance of the Palestinian entity and its security forces throughout a long period of time, since once redeployment is done the situation is irreversible to a large extent. The last 24 years were such a test and in general the PA failed.

3. The plan lacks a necessary chapter that professionally analyzes the terrain and points out the implications of this analysis. The strategic security value of the Jordan valley and the high-altitude mountains along the mountain ridge, the need to retain open lines of supply and movement from Israel to the Jordan valley, the proximity of the proposed Palestinian territory to Israeli population centers and key traffic routes are mentioned very briefly here and there but there is no profound consideration of this matter. The only issue that is treated differently is the special security regime that should prevail in the area close to the Ben Gurion international airport, and even this analysis is not satisfactory. At the same time the paper lacks an analysis of the difficulties that Israel may face if it has to enter the Palestinian state and especially Palestinian population centers after a Palestinian state is established.

4. In view of the developments in the broader Middle East the main threat to the stability of the Palestinian entity will probably come from radical Islamic groups. Against this threat, it is not clear at all if the PASF can be effective, and these are the forces that can change the entire nature of the threat to Israel, especially if pro-Iranian elements manage to destabilize Jordan and Egypt, or the Palestinian entity itself. The Arab spring that began in 2011, and became a Jihadist winter, is not likely to end soon. Israel and its pragmatic Arab neighbors are likely to be facing enhanced threats, as a result, for the foreseeable future, and this could last decades. A security paradigm that does not presuppose this instability continuity is highly problematic for Israeli future.

5. The transition system proposed by the plan is based on measuring a list of criteria and evaluating the PASF readiness to fulfill its mission. Yet, with the "Phases Theory" in mind, the Palestinian logic is that they can easily pass the technical tests of the plan, and then, after full Israeli withdrawal, change course. The plan gives no remedy to this quite expected sequence of events or to the possibility that after the completion of the transition the level of readiness of the PASF will deteriorate. It is as if no lessons were learned from experience with the disengagement in Gaza or the redeployment from Lebanon (though this experience is mentioned in the plan).

6. The CNAS paper claims that the plan respects Israel's security requirements (as presented in the report by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) and goes along with the principle that Israel will be able to defend itself by itself. Yet in fact it puts Israel security to a large extent in the hands of the PASF and a small contingent of American forces. The chances that this combination is going to provide Israel with the security it requires are very slim and the paper itself mentions many examples of failures of such

forces. A much bigger local force and a much bigger US force were not doing an impressive job in Iraq.

7. Moreover, the idea that the US will be actively involved as an ongoing mediator and as a force responsible for operational missions is a recipe for creating tensions between Israel and the United States. Experience from the second Intifada proves how naïve the American officers were, how difficult it was to share intelligence with them and due to that how likely such tension is. The basic concept of deploying foreign forces to perform operational missions of protecting Israel is false and cannot last as recent history proved again and again. There is no reason and no justification to hope that American forces will behave differently (if one examines American history).

8. The role US took as author of the plan makes it an American plan. This will prevent the Palestinians from showing any flexibility regarding the plan, especially since the Americans managed to find a retired Israeli general to sign on it and claim that their IDF interlocuters supported the plan. The American ownership will be another cause for tension and disagreements between Israel and the United States, as the plan is far from giving adequate responses to Israel's concerns. That's why the security plan should be worked out between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and if they decide to ask for American help – then the Americans can intervene. If the United States is more interested in peace and in this plan than the Palestinians (and the plan clearly reflects it as it again and again refers to all Palestinian expectations and demands as justified and as if they must be addressed and accepted) then the Americans are going to adopt the Palestinian position whenever there's a dispute between the sides (as a matter of fact, the plan explicitly says that this is going to be the case) and end up in repeated conflict with Israel.

9. Israel is not given a veto power when there is disagreement about the security matters and is not promised automatic American support if it decides to enter Palestinian territory in what it considers extreme situation. This again guarantees tensions between Israel and the US. After the PA under both Arafat and Abbas made a mockery of its commitments in the Oslo Accords to fight terror and instead supports terror, incites terror and hatred and pays salaries to arrested terrorists without any real reaction from the US, let alone the rest of the international community, it seems quite odd that the plan gives the US the role of mediating daily between Israel and the Palestinians.

10. The security plan presented by the US doesn't deal with the arrangements concerning Jerusalem. It is unclear whether this disregard is due to a belief that Jerusalem should remain under Israeli sovereignty or owing to another unknown reason.

11. And finally, the idea of putting the carriage in front of the horses, namely producing a security plan before the principles of the agreement are clear is counterproductive. Especially as the plan explicitly and implicitly supports the Palestinian position on all the key issues ('67 lines as the basis for the borders, two states with no Palestinian recognition in Israel as the Nation state of the Jewish people, the Arab Peace initiative as the basis for the agreement ignoring its problems including its indirect reference to the "right of return", turning the Palestinian state into a "Jewish free" territory etc.). In this way Israel is deprived from its ability to negotiate. If the Palestinians realize that the US expects so many concessions from Israel on security matters they have no incentive to show flexibility on other components of the peace agreement or on security. Israel can take security risks if it is convinced that its other demands are met, but taking those

risks for nothing is dangerous. In this respect, General Allen's security plan distances peace instead of its intention to make it possible. The horses (recognition, change of narrative etc.) should be put in front of the carriage to enable movement.

So, what are more acceptable principles for a security plan that Israel and the US should agree upon before starting negotiations and bearing in my mind Israel's vulnerabilities, despite its military strength?

1. Israel should control the outer perimeter of the territory.

2. The Security Border of Israel will be the Jordan River. Width of Jordan area will be determined. In October 1995, Rabin spoke about the Jordan Valley in "the widest sense of the term." Not the riverbed alone.

3. Israeli security control along the entire river especially the international crossing, with adequate access to Israeli forces to the Jordan Velley area. To overcome questions of sovereignty crossings of roads may be on different altitude to avoid unnecessary friction.

4. Israeli security control extends to any airport or seaport constructed in the territories.

5. Israel must have an over-riding security responsibility to operate against hostile units in the Palestinian zone as well as to neutralize weapons factories producing systems that are outlawed by the agreement. The security arrangements must refer meticulously to the future use of tunnels in the West Bank, just like in the Gaza Strip, in a way that gives Israel the right to thwart Tunnel construction (the CNAS plan envisages a nonexistent technical solution)

Operational and tactical comments on the CNAS plan

(This part follows the CNAS paper and refers to the topics as they appear in that paper)

Chapter 1 - Overview

Political and security context

1. The authors of the plan claim that the lack of confidence between the two sides stems from the fact that the Palestinians lost any faith in Israel's willingness to withdraw from the West Bank and that this lack of faith coupled with harsh day to day social and economic conditions has led to several rounds of violence. It sounds, right from the beginning, as if Abu-Mazen himself is writing this paper. The fact of the matter is that the Palestinians were presented several times with Israeli offers to withdraw from most of the West Bank and to establish a Palestinian state and they refused, primarily because they were not given what they wanted regarding the recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people and the refugees issues. The "rounds of violence" were not "rounds" but violent campaigns initiated by the Palestinians motivated by their hope that they can get more concessions through terror, which were encouraged by the ongoing international readiness to accept this logic as an explanation of (and for some even justification for) terror. It was also caused by the ongoing incitement and hate indoctrination that promotes terror in various forms to annihilate the Jewish state as the raison d'etre of the Palestinian people.

2. Israeli mistrust of the Palestinians is because for 24 years they kept perpetrating terrorism and deceiving Israelis and the international community by expressing in English commitment to the accords but ignoring it all together in Arabic and in action. And yes, Israelis are also worried about the regional situation, reluctant to make strategic concession (not "decisions" as written in the report) and are skeptic that the two states solution can meet their security requirements.

3. The reasons the US repeatedly failed in their peace efforts and has no achievements to show is the lack of understanding of the American administration of the nature of the conflict and of the parties involved in it. It takes much more learning than what is presented in this paper for the US to become effective in this peace-making effort.

4. The authors speak highly of the API (Arab Peace Initiative) while totally ignoring its problematic aspects. The API is a dictate to Israel forcing it to accept resolution 194 (which in Arab interpretation includes the famous "right of return") as a basis for the solution of the refugees' problem and denying the option of patriation of these refugees in the hosting Arab states, and at same time ignoring the rights of the Jewish refugees from Arab lands. This is all in addition to its demand that Israel withdraw to the 1967 lines including the Golan Heights. There are positive elements in the API and Israel has acknowledged them, and the Arabs can come to the negotiations table with the API as their position, but to expect Israel to accept the API as an agreed upon basis for the negotiations is quite strange.

5. The paper underestimates the threats to Israeli security from the outside and especially disregards the possibility that Iranians are going to have an impact on the situation in the Palestinian authority, in Jordan and of course in Syria.

Internal threats

1. The paper basically ignores the possibility that once a Palestinian state becomes independent radical elements can take over through a democratic process. In this case there is nothing the PASF can do and almost nothing for Israel to do. Therefore, the security system should be able to handle this kind of situation as well. The system offered by this paper is totally incapable of doing that.

Israeli security requirements

1. Though the paper mentions many of the Israeli security requirements as presented in the paper written by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), it presents them in a brief, short-handed way and ignores the opening chapter of the JCPA paper that deals with the necessity of a change in the Palestinian narrative and stopping the incitement as the fundamental requirement of Israel's security.
2. The paper stresses that persuading Israelis to entrust part of their security to the US would be one of the most challenging hurdles for the agreement. There's a good reason for that and American soldiers should not be entrusted with securing Israel. Our experience tells us that this would lead to failure and tensions between Israel and the US.
3. Using the Iraqi example to explain why the Israelis cannot trust the Palestinians is extremely relevant as the Palestinians too don't have strong political leadership and with Abu-Mazen about to leave the political scene this becomes even more problematic.

Palestinian requirements for security

1. This chapter repeatedly claims that the Palestinians would not accept any solution that includes a visible Israeli force on their land or any limit to their mobility. The fact is that the Palestinians always lived with some foreign forces, as there was never a Palestinian state and they may well agree to all kinds of compromises just like the Egyptians and the Jordanians did. The reference made to the Gaza withdrawal is very correct – if no Israeli presences is allowed in the Palestinian territory the chances that the Palestinians will use this territory to launch terror attacks against Israel are considerable. So, we should learn our lesson from the Gaza withdrawal and not repeat the same mistake.
2. The practice of entering A areas became necessary because the Palestinian terrorists turned these areas into a safe haven and because the PASF doesn't have neither the will nor the power to take care of the matter. It's not clear why the authors assume this situation is going to change after a peace agreement. The PASF will be more able to fight crime but not necessarily terror.

Chapter 2 – Organizing principles of the security system

Assumptions

1. It's not clear if the benefits of implementing certain security steps before reaching an agreement really outweigh the risks and the damage they may incur – they give the Palestinians the impressions that they can get something for nothing and discourage them from being flexible in the negotiations.
2. The assumptions about the nature of the agreement - two independent states along the 1967 lines, where the Palestinian state is "Judenrein" - is problematic. This should be left to the parties.

3. There is an assumption that in a worst-case scenario of a complete collapse of the agreement Israel would be able to defend itself by itself because of its strong military capabilities. That is probably true but the question is the price and there's no reference to that. The Gaza case, including the repeating operations, gives us a clue of what it might take for Israel to defend itself. It cannot be assumed that the IDF will easily be able to re-enter territory from which it withdrew, if it becomes apparent that the hostile intentions of its adversaries remain the same. This was what Israel experienced in Southern Lebanon in 2006 and in successive military operations in the Gaza strips.

4. The paper speculates that ending the conflict could certainly have positive consequences for the Middle East. This is not necessarily true. The agreement might cause a very strong negative reaction, strengthen radical elements in the region and make them readier to act militarily to thwart the agreement. If radical elements will continue to strengthen their control over parts of the Middle East under the leadership of Iran the impact of an agreement could also be negative. We should prepare for that eventuality as well and not be overly optimistic.

Key principles of a security system

The paper claims that the security system it proposes does not foreclose Israel's ability to act unilaterally in self-defense, but in fact the complicate systems does exactly that. The fact that a sentence can be written on a paper does not make it a reality. The paper itself admits that an Israeli military activity inside the Palestinian state is equivalent to any other state acting in self-defense against another state, with all the political risks and other consequences. To mitigate these risks the paper suggests a possible discussion between Israel and the US regarding the conditions under which Israel can count on American support in such cases. This is very dangerous as it limits Israel's freedom to defend itself and raises the chances that Israel will find itself lacking American support.

There is a severe contradiction between giving the Palestinian a clear timeline for Israeli withdrawal and making the redeployment dependent on conditions and benchmarks. First it is going to create pressure over Israel to agree that the Palestinians have succeeded to pass their criteria and secondly it does not refer to what is going to happen after the completion of the withdrawal if there is a deterioration in the performance of the PASF.

Most of the multiple layers for confronting external threats exist anyhow and are functioning quite well. Replacing the IDF presence in the Jordan valley with PASF and a small American force is going to considerably worsen the ability to contend with the threat, even if the physical obstacle is going to be improved (this improvement can be implemented without a peace agreement). First, the motivation of the PASF and the Americans is going to be much lower than that of the IDF and secondly the removal of the IDF may cause threats to the stability of Jordan from radical Palestinian elements. The paper itself admits that the technological solutions cannot address the deep concerns of Israel.

Minimizing Israeli visibility to Palestinians and pursue significant early steps that signal a change – this is a mistaken approach. There are steps that can be taken if there is no terror, but the problem that prevents peace is not the Israeli visibility – it is the Palestinian narrative. As far as checkpoints are concerned – there are very few inside the West Bank, and they are necessary for security purposes, so lifting them may make it easier for terrorists to carry out terror attacks, which may force the entire process to stop. Most of the checkpoints are located on the entrances to Israel.

Plan a conditions-dependent redeployment with timetables and effective remediation process – as stated before this entire idea is full of risks and lacks remedy to the main problems.

Conduct significant upgrades to security systems – this is not helpful without IDF presence and on the other hand can be implemented today, regardless of an agreement.

Build Joint operation centers – these are minor modifications to the existing coordination system and the Palestinians can walk away from them, if they decide to do so, without any sanctions. They can also, as stated in the paper, choose to ignore the information Israel provides them. American presence and role in these centers may be counterproductive.

Employ American forces for training equipping and monitoring and for highly limited operations – a dangerous idea, that will lead to tensions between Israel and the US, since as those responsible for everything, including the security plan itself, the Americans will be biased.

Timetable for redeployment –
The paper admits that the basic assumption that you may have a flexible timetable of 3 periods of 5 years each is futile since the Palestinians will refuse any extension and the Israelis will mistrust their Palestinian partners. An overly optimistic idea is that towards the end of the 15 years intended duration of the redeployment Palestinians may show flexibility and the US will be able to present this flexibility to Israel. This is a naïve assumption and the paper itself admits it. In other words, this entire structure is an oxymoron. Redeployment should be conditioned on changes in the narrative and in the performance and it is going to take a long time before Israel is convinced. Yet, the basic assumption should be that Israel has no intention to rule over another people and it is interested in bringing this situation to an end as soon as possible. Therefore, Israel has no interest in dragging its feet once its requirements are met.

Another problem is again the assumption of full Israeli withdrawal and that the overall security responsibility will remain in Israel hands only as long as there are Israeli settlements in the territory of the future Palestinian state. Israel's security requirements are not derived from the presence of the settlements (putting aside the debate on their security value), but from the security needs of Israel itself. That said, the concept of a Judenrein Palestinian state has no justification and the decision should be left to the Jewish settlers.

Forces on the Jordan river

The concept of full Israeli withdrawal raises the question of what is the small American force going to do if after a while the challenge becomes ultra-radical Sunni Moslem groups or Iranian forces. It sounds like the idea of Israeli withdrawal from the Golan heights was carried out just to find out a few years later that instead of a well-disciplined state army Israel faces ISIS and Hezbollah on the border. The Israeli concerns in this context are described in the plan only partially and the deployment of American forces will provide a very limited and vulnerable remedy to Israel's concerns. I agree that the MFO experience is totally irrelevant for many reasons, beginning with its completely different mandate.

The option of an Israeli invisible force along a very narrow strip of land is bizarre, and the idea that the Palestinians should be compensated for accepting it is another expression of the overall submissiveness to the Palestinians that characterizes the entire paper. The concept of Israeli forces in civilian uniform reappears in the paper several times and is always strange and imaginary.

The idea of joint patrols failed in the early years of the implementation of the Oslo accords and in this new context of patrolling the border is a guarantee for trouble. Palestinian forces may have a role but not in joint patrols. The option of American forces along the Jordanian side with Palestinian control of the western bank of the river is even more problematic due to expected Jordanian concerns, anticipated by the paper too.

To sum this issue, the Jordan valley, as Rabin said: "in the widest meaning of this word", should remain under Israeli security responsibility for a very long time and maybe even under Israeli sovereignty. This option may resemble a bit the last option mentioned in the paper that leaves the security responsibility for some time under Israeli responsibility (depending on the way one interprets the length of the time during which Israel controls the area of the Jordan Valley under this option).

Final decisions on redeployment
The process and the procedures of the security implementation and verification group (SIVG) is built to deprive the veto power from Israel. They guarantee that the PASF will eventually pass the tests, and raise the chances of tensions between Israel and the US on the political level, if there is disagreement on the security level.

The paper mentions the option that domestic developments in the Palestinian side and regional developments may cause the Israelis to ask for postponing the redeployment but the only way of handling it is a joint Israeli American Dialogue. This is far from enough and may contribute to Israeli-American tensions.

Israel should have the veto power on redeployment and since it does not want to rule over the Palestinians it is going to redeploy as soon as the conditions enable it.

Israeli re-entry

The paper states correctly that the concept of re-entry is going to cause harsh disagreement, as was the case with the Oslo accords "right of hot pursuit" that eventually forced Israel to change its entire way of entering the A areas. In this respect the plan is again adopting the Palestinian approach.

The CNAS plan makes a false assumption that faced with external conventional threat the Palestinians will ask for Israeli support and will be ready to allow the IDF to enter their territory. In fact the likelihood of this scenario is low both because of national pride and because of the possibility that many Palestinians will feel much more supportive of the foreign aggressor (many Palestinians were dancing and celebrating when Saddam Hussein launched rockets towards Israel and even today Saddam is very popular in the Palestinian street). This is just another expression of how faint is the authors acquaintance with the Palestinian state of mind.

Furthermore, due to the expected difficulty in including reference to re-entry in the language of a peace agreement the authors give up on this option and live Israel to deal with its problems, that may appear quite often, on its own or through consultations with the US, which is even worse since it may create tensions between Israel and its main ally.

The security system at the end state

Palestinian Security Forces

The assumption is that the Palestinian state will be non-militarized and hence will not pose a security threat to Israel. This is ridiculous! It will not pose a conventional military threat but if it does not have an unlimited monopoly on the use of force from its territory, (and many Arab states don't have such monopoly) it may easily become a security threat. The paper understands it but provides a very insufficient remedy to this problem. For example, the highly capable counterterrorism unit that the paper recommends being a part of the Palestinian forces is highly questionable and it is seems that Israel will not have, according to the paper, a veto power over future acquisition of arms by the Palestinians.

Counterterrorism System

First the paper misidentifies the challenge that the Palestinians are going to face and define the potential threat to its security and to Israel's security as extremists. This again reveals the basic problem of misunderstanding the Palestinians. Many current Palestinian terrorists and future potential opponents of the agreement are not extremists but Palestinian main streamers who adopt the messages they have been indoctrinated to believe in. The refugees too are going to constitute a big challenge and they are not necessarily extremists. This is going to make the mission of the security forces and the judicial system much more difficult.

The lack of a full and comprehensive counterterrorism cycle in the Palestinian Authority is not mainly a result of it being a failed entity with corrupt administration, but a derivative of its view of terror as a legitimate way of action against Israel, even if it is not always a recommended way in all its forms. Based on political reasoning the PA takes steps against Hamas activists, but never accuses them of terrorism. According to the PA law, terrorists are the fighting sector of the Palestinian society and if they die or get arrested by Israel they deserve a large monthly salary or allocations.

So in the future, establishing a well-functioning counterterrorism system will require not just building the various organizations and infrastructure, including the judicial system and adequate prison system, but a change in the narrative and a change in the motivation. Until that happens no significant change in the Palestinian fight against terror can be expected.

Anyhow, the entire system that is described in this chapter reflects how naïve and detached from reality the authors of this plan are. The chances that the system will work as envisaged in the plan are slim. Cases in which Israeli intelligence will be leaked to suspects are to be expected and the Palestinian forces will be facing difficulties in executing arrests, putting people to trial and keeping them in jail. The idea that an American mediator will determine if Israeli information justifies an operation by the Palestinian force if there is disagreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians is dangerous, both because any mistake by the Americans may be very costly, especially in a time sensitive situation, and because the ability of the Americans to understand this kind of information has been proven to be not as good as the Israeli capability. The idea that in case of disagreement higher echelons are going to intervene is ridiculous, especially when time is limited. The American role was problematic in the past and there is no guarantee that it will be any different in the future. The American administration refused to give Israel a green light to bomb the Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981 and failed to understand intelligence in many other cases.

If in the end of this process the Israeli leadership chooses to act out of self-defense, as mentioned in the paper, the entire agreement is going to collapse. So, this entire system is based on baseless dreams of the authors. It should be emphasized again that first there got to be a fundamental change in the Palestinian narrative and only then there can be a functioning counterterrorism system on the Palestinian side.

Scenarios

The scenarios analyzed in the paper suffer from all the above-mentioned maladies. They are over optimistic. What is going to happen if the sensitive Israeli information about a rocket factory is leaked to the terrorists and the people and the equipment disappear? What happens if the Palestinians resume the "revolving door" policy and release terrorists because they don't like a certain Israeli policy? What if the time needed for the process to materialize is too long for dealing with a time sensitive target that must be attacked? If Israel attacks without Palestinian consent the entire agreement may collapse.

Border Security

Crossing points

The paper starts referring to this issue by stating how important the crossing points are for Palestinian dignity and sovereignty. Not a word about the experience of Palestinian repeated attempts to smuggle weapons and other forbidden material through the crossings in the past. Here again, unless there is a long-lasting change in the Palestinian narrative and behavior, Israel cannot trust a Palestinian force to oversee the crossings, even if there are Americans present there and Israelis may monitor the crossings without being visible and intervene when they feel that there is a justification for that. This is true for both people and merchandise. Israel should also be skeptic about the ability of the small American unit to overcome terror attacks on the crossing.

For example, what happens if a Palestinian refugee from Lebanon arrives at the crossing and attempts to cross, and the Israelis want to deny him entry? Should Israel share with the Palestinians the information it has about the person? Clearly here too, according to the plan Israel does not have a veto power.

Border trace security system

The expensive system proposed in the paper is not sufficient to cope with persistent and large-scale threats. For this kind of threats there is no substitute for the IDF. Even against small groups of terrorists this is not a good enough obstacle. They can ambush the small American contingent or the PASF and cross the obstacles. What really counts is the motivation of the force and much less the physical obstacle. The reason the authors present this system is again simply to please the Palestinians, while ignoring the fact that there is hardly any Palestinian population along the Jordan valley with some exceptions that can be a part of the Palestinian entity, as is the situation today in Jerico.

Israeli Palestinian Borders

Exceptional security Zones and Anti Tunneling Technology

The idea of restricting the height of the buildings in the areas adjacent to Ben Gurion airport are insufficient. If Israel leaves this area towards the end of the redeployment phase it should trust the Palestinians to do a perfect job there long before the PASF was really tested. The paper calls for both parties to agree on the specifics of these special zones. But this is going to be very difficult, because as stated above "the devil is in the details". The assumption that a technical solution to overcome the tunnels threat is going to be available is very optimistic too.

Non-Ground Domains

Airspace security

The paper supports the construction of a Palestinian airport in the West Bank (and maybe in Gaza too). The entire approach here is both over optimistic, simplistic and delusional. The chapter begins - correctly - with asserting that airspace security with a Palestinian airport appears to be very difficult to achieve and yet suggests quick fixes for everything. So, here are some questions that were left unasked and unanswered in the plan. What if the vetting system fails (the number of PASF personnel involved in terror is not negligible and we all remember several pilots of passenger planes who crushed their planes for various reasons and several well vetted people like Snowden who changed their mind). What if a plane that reaches the altitude of 10000 feet decides to crash on a target in Israel? Should Israel keep fighters in the air permanently? Why the Palestinians cannot use adjacent airports?

Maritime security

The paper supports the construction of a Palestinian port. Here the main challenge is inspecting incoming merchandise. Smuggling occurs even through Ashdod port, so obviously if Israelis are not authorized to conduct the inspections themselves under any arrangement there is a fair chance that the smugglers will have the upper hand.

I doubt if the idea of a sea fence was ever tested in similar conditions? It seems to me that it can be relatively easily overcome.

Electromagnetic spectrum security

This can be solved but it should be clear that Israel has the leading authority for assigning frequencies to avoid chaos and to guarantee that its military needs are met.

Regional Security

The assumption that a peace agreement that will include an improvement of the relations with pragmatic Arab states will contribute to Israel's security is intuitive but not necessarily true. There can be some reaction to this improvement that will create further threats and it is not certain that the Arab states will be successful in handling them.

The notion that early integration to a security system will contribute to the support of the Israeli security establishment and the general Israeli public for the negotiations and their 2 states outcome is strange. Israel is a democracy in which decisions are made by elected leaders. There is no need to circumvent its decisions.

The plan describes the fact that Israel was not invited to take part in regional coalitions fighting Iran and Radical Islamists as a lost opportunity. But in fact, Israel should not be formally included in such coalition and it has a good security cooperation with the key members of these coalitions that translates into practical contribution to their efforts without making any concessions to the Palestinians. The attempt to claim that Israel would be better off if it made such dangerous compromises because this will pave the road to including it in regional coalitions is baseless and ridiculous, since in most cases it is the pragmatic Arab countries that seek Israel's support regardless of the Palestinian issue.

If Israel is going to be a member of the "Regional Security Framework" it has - according to the plan - to support the Arab Peace Initiative which as I already explained is dangerous and

unacceptable from an Israeli point of view. It is just one aspect of the problems that may emerge from asking the divided war torn Arab world to become deeply involved in the peace process. If they are willing to convince the Palestinians to show flexibility, which is in their interest, they are more than welcome, and the same applies to their potential willingness to facilitate such Palestinian compromises by publicly supporting them. But we should remember that they will always formally side with the Palestinians when there is going to be a disagreement between Israel and the Palestinians, and this is true even to the inner envelope – Egypt and Jordan.

Transition to the end state
Transition process after the agreement

This chapter repeats the old and wrong assumption that the Palestinians need to see quick real and visible changes on the ground to cause fundamental political shift and to persuade many Palestinian fence-sitters. It is again repeating Palestinian propaganda directed to Western audiences. If this is the case why has the Palestinian policy not changed after the rapid implementation of Oslo or after the complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza?

This chapter guarantees that eventually the Palestinians will get what they want without changing their narrative and stopping their incitement.

The transition process and the security implementation and verification group

This is basically a technical chapter, but still there are some problems with it. For example, the plan states that the branch that will responsible for training the PASF will be firewalled from the branch responsible for evaluating their readiness, which will be strictly American. The chances that this separation will exist in a real world are low.
Another problem is that the plan suggests that the monitoring will go on even after a certain territory was delivered to Palestinian responsibility. This is absurd, since there is no way in which the transfer of authority may be reversed.

Phase 1: Early visible Steps on the Ground

This chapter expects Israel to accept all the Palestinian demands without giving anything in return.

The paper expects Israel to cease immediately all incursions into Palestinian controlled Area A, outside extreme emergency situations. This is unjustified, since it means that no one is going to take care of terror cells that are very dangerous but do not constitute yet an emergency. The IDF does not conduct these incursions just for fun or to humiliate the PA. All of them involve putting soldiers in harm's way and are necessary for security purposes. Even according to the authors of the plan, in the early stage of the implementation of the agreement, the PASF are not ready to replace the IDF.

Then the paper insists that Israel turn parts of Area C to Palestinian civil control and eliminate any impediment to movement that are not strictly necessary for security. This again is problematic, since there are very few checkpoints inside the West Bank and they wouldn't be there if they were not justified by security considerations.

The paper recommends handing over the security responsibility to the Palestinians in the first phase in the northern areas of Jenin, because there are relatively few settlements. One can assume that beyond the fact that you don't need to evacuate settlements in this area there is

also a hidden assumption that there is a relation between the presence of settlements and the inclination or the motivation to carry out terror attacks. This assumption is questionable and the terror from Gaza after the redeployment attests to that.

Phases 2,3 and 4: a conditions-dependent redeployment with target Timetables

This chapter is overloaded with technical details and examples that predate the events and reflect a sort of escapism to the obvious, due to the insistence on avoiding confronting the real problem, namely the Palestinian narrative. It does mention the Israeli concern that the PASF will not be able and will not be willing to conduct the missions Israel and the US expect them to perform, but it provides an evaluation process that does not address these concerns and especially the will issue and will guarantee delivering the security responsibility to the PASF even if they don't have the will or even the ability to perform their missions.

Here again the plan claims that the evaluation process will continue after the delivery of the security responsibilities in a certain area, and if there is a problem the entire process of delivering security responsibilities will stop. This is presented as a heavy price charged from the Palestinians. But there is no reversibility and there is no reference to what will happen if during the interim phase the PASF perform well, but after the completion of the deal their performance deteriorates.

This again is a recipe for mounting tensions between Israel and the United States, as they are bound to disagree on these issues. As authors of the agreement, the Americans will be committed to the technical wording of the agreement and disregard the overall security picture, and because of their naivete they may be easily misled by the Palestinians and misunderstand their behavior. There is also the proposal to deploy 300-800 American soldiers to perform operational roles. What happens if they fail in their missions and Israeli security is harmed and if during their attempt to perform their mission they suffer casualties? These scenarios come on top of the many other reasons to believe that this plan will cause unwished for tensions between Israel and the US.

Steps to be taken prior to the agreement
Internal Security

The concept of taking steps towards the Palestinians before the agreement is reached makes sense only if there is simultaneously some progress on the Palestinian attitude to terror. As long as the Palestinians refer to arrested terrorists as the fighting sector of their society and insist on paying them large salaries, there is no reason to help them further develop their military capabilities and build a judicial system that will not take measures against terrorists (who are freedom fighters in their view).

As is stated in the plan the PASF is adequately equipped and trained to conduct its current missions. Today it acts against Hamas, both because this movement constitutes a political danger to the PA and because the PA leadership does not agree with the terror policy of Hamas, out of different cost-benefit considerations regarding the risks and the benefits for Palestinian interests each policy may bring. The PA supports, at this point of time, "Popular resistance", namely violence without the use of firearms or explosives (they sometimes are in favor of stabbings and ramming and sometimes prefer to oppose it), while Hamas supports all kinds of terror from the areas controlled by the PA and restrain from the areas it controls (Gaza).

It must be said that the paragraph about the way the Palestinian court will function is a sublime example of the extreme naiveté of the authors and their absolute detachment from Middle East reality. The chapters about the option of building detention facility in which the authors stop shy of supporting the construction of a well-functioning detention center for the PA at this stage because it may send highly negative message to the Palestinian public is a great example of their adoption of the Palestinian point of view and their submissiveness to the Palestinians. It is a bit awkward that an Israeli retired General has signed to that.

The same submissiveness transpires from using the same argument to justify why work on the border trace layered security system should not start at this stage: It could send the wrong message to the Palestinian public.

Airspace Security

The plan suggests announcing that technical experts from both sides were gathering to begin planning the arrangements for building a Palestinian airport as a signal to the Palestinians that real change was underway. The problem is that the construction of an independent Palestinian airport is very problematic and even though the CNAS plan strongly supports its construction, in fact it may be that it won't be built. Under this background, Israel should not commit itself in advance to a specific outcome of the negotiations and tie its hands. Here again the paper reflects a sharp bias towards perceived Palestinian rigid demands, ignoring Israel's concerns and security requirements. and giving priority to pleasing the Palestinian public opinion while ignoring the Israeli public opinion.

Regional Security

This final chapter reflects again the deep misunderstanding of the authors of the Arab Peace Initiative. For example, it is referred to as the Saudi initiative that was somewhat revised, where in fact it went through significant changes, and as a basis for a negotiated agreement where in fact it is a dictate to Israel. It is also described as encapsulating a far-reaching promise to Israel, where in fact it demands Israel to take unreasonable security risks. Israel has commended, as mentioned above, the positive elements of the API, but the Arabs want Israel to embrace it as the basis for negotiations (the CNAS paper actually says so) and this makes no sense.

Conclusion

General Allen's security plan, presented in the CNAS paper is a dangerous plan for Israel's security and Israel's leaders did the right and reasonable deed in refusing to accept it.

Annex A – Secretary Kerry's Six Points as presents on December 2016

1. Provide for secure and recognized international borders between Israel and a viable and contiguous Palestine, negotiated based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed equivalent swaps. Resolution 242, which has been enshrined in international law for 50 years, provides for the withdrawal of Israel from territory it occupied in 1967 in return for peace with its neighbors and secure and recognized borders. It has long been accepted by both sides, and it remains the basis for an agreement today. As Secretary, one of the first issues I worked out with the Arab League was their agreement that the reference in the Arab Peace Initiative to the 1967 lines included the concept of land swaps, which the Palestinians have acknowledged. This is necessary to reflect practical realities on the ground, and mutually agreed equivalent swaps will ensure the

agreement is fair to both sides. There is also broad recognition of Israel's need to ensure that the borders are secure and defensible, and that the territory of Palestine is viable and contiguous. Virtually everyone I have spoken to has been clear on this principle as well: No changes by Israel to the 1967 lines will be recognized by the international community unless agreed to by both sides.

2. Fulfill the vision of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of two states for two peoples, one Jewish and one Arab, with mutual recognition and full equal rights for all their respective citizens. This has been the foundational principle of the two state solution from the beginning: Creating a state for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian people, where each can achieve their national aspirations. And resolution 181 is incorporated into the foundational documents of both the Israelis and Palestinians. Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state has been the U.S. position for years, and based on my conversations, I am convinced many others are now are prepared to accept it as well – provided the need for a Palestinian state is also addressed. We also know there are some 1.7 million Arab citizens who call Israel their home and must now and always be able to live as equal citizens, which makes this a difficult issue for Palestinians and others in the Arab world. That is why it is so important that in recognizing each other's homeland – Israel for the Jewish people and Palestine for the Palestinian people – both sides reaffirm their commitment to upholding full equal rights for all of their respective citizens.

3. Provide for a just, agreed, fair and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue, with international assistance, that includes compensation, options and assistance in finding permanent homes, acknowledgment of suffering and other measures necessary for a comprehensive resolution consistent with two states for two peoples. The plight of many Palestinian refugees is heartbreaking, and all agree their needs must be addressed. As part of a comprehensive resolution, they must be provided with compensation, their suffering must be acknowledged, and there will need to be options and assistance in finding permanent homes. The international community can provide significant support and assistance, including in raising money to help ensure the compensation and other needs of the refugees are met, and many have expressed a willingness to contribute. But there is general recognition that the solution must be consistent with two states for two peoples, and cannot affect the fundamental character of Israel.

4. Provide an agreed resolution for Jerusalem as the internationally recognized capital of the two states, and protect and assure freedom of access to the holy sites consistent with the established status quo. Jerusalem is the most sensitive issue for both sides, and the solution must meet the needs not only of the parties, but of all three monotheistic faiths. That is why the holy sites that are sacred to billions of people around the world must be protected and remain accessible, and the established status quo maintained. Most acknowledge that Jerusalem should not be divided again like it was in 1967. At the same time, there is broad recognition that there will be no peace agreement without reconciling the basic aspirations of both sides to have capitals there.

5. Satisfy Israel's security needs and bring a full end to the occupation, while ensuring that Israel can defend itself effectively and that Palestine can provide security for its people in a sovereign and non-militarized state. Security is the fundamental issue for Israel. Everyone understands that no Israeli government can ever accept an agreement that does not satisfy its security needs or risks creating an enduring security threat like Gaza in the West Bank. And Israel must be able to defend itself effectively, including against terrorism and other regional threats. In fact, there is a real willingness by Egypt, Jordan and others to work together with Israel on meeting key security challenges. I believe these collective efforts, including close coordination on border security, intelligence

sharing, and joint operations, can play a critical role in securing the peace. At the same time, fully ending the occupation is the fundamental issue for the Palestinians: They need to know that the military occupation will really end after an agreed transitional process, and that they can live in freedom and dignity in a sovereign state while providing security for their population even without a military of their own. This is widely accepted as well. Balancing those requirements was among the most important challenge we faced in the negotiations, but one where the United States could provide the most assistance. *That's why a team led by General John Allen, one of our nation's foremost military minds, and dozens of experts from the Department of Defense and other agencies, engaged extensively with the IDF on trying to find solutions that could help Israel address its legitimate security needs. They developed innovative approaches to creating unprecedented, multi-layered border security, enhancing Palestinian capacity, and enabling Israel to retain the ability to address threats by itself even when the occupation had ended. General Allen and his team were not suggesting any particular outcome or timeline– they were simply working on ways to support whatever the negotiators agreed to. And they did some very impressive work that gives me confidence that Israel's security requirements can be met.*

6. End the conflict and all outstanding claims, enabling normalized relations and enhanced regional security for all as envisaged by the Arab Peace Initiative. It is essential for both sides that the final status agreement resolves all the outstanding issues and finally brings closure to the conflict, so they can move ahead to a new era of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. For Israel, this must also bring broader peace with its Arab neighbors. That is the fundamental promise of the Arab Peace Initiative, which key Arab leaders have affirmed. The API also envisions enhanced security for all in the region. This is the area where Israel and the Arab world are looking at the greatest moment of potential transformation in the Middle East since Israel's creation in 1948. The Arab world faces its own set of security challenges. With Israeli-Palestinian peace, Israel, the United States, Jordan and Egypt -- together with the GCC countries -- would be ready and willing to define a new security partnership for the region that would be groundbreaking.

Security Requirements in The West Bank in the Context of An Israeli-Palestinian Agreement

"CT operations are necessary to mitigate a sanctuary, but to defeat a terrorist group, host nation capacity must grow to ensure a sustainable level of security… Without close-in access, fix and find methods become nearly impossible… Predator strikes are effective where they complement, not replace, the capabilities of the state security apparatus, but they are not scalable in the absence of underlying infrastructure, intelligence and physical presence".

General Stan McChrystal 2009 report on Afghanistan
(as quoted in Robert M. Gates, Duty, p. 346).

"As for security, every state has the right to self-defense, and Israel must be able to defend itself – by itself- against any threat.
Provisions must also be robust enough to prevent a resurgence of terrorism; to stop the infiltration of weapons; and to provide effective border security. The full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces should be coordinated with the assumption of Palestinian security responsibility in a sovereign, non-militarized state. The duration of the transition period must be agreed, and the effectiveness of security arrangements must be demonstrated".

President Barack Obama, Speech at the AIPAC Conference 21 May 2011.

"Powerful confrontation and resolute and armed resistance is the cure of this ruinous regime [Israel]… The West Bank should be armed like Gaza and those who are interested in Palestine's destiny should take action to arm the people of the West Bank".

Iran's Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamene'i, Twitter, November 2014:
"Nine ways and reasons to destroy Israel".

Part I: The Centrality of the Security Challenge in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

Peace between the State of Israel and a Palestinian State can only emerge through detailed negotiations, which must take into account, first and foremost, the security challenge. The lessons of the post-Oslo generation are clear. Without robust security measures, not only the lives of citizens on both sides would be at risk - the very survival of the peace as such may easily fall prey, again, to the actions of those who wish to destroy it. Thus, side by side with the need for mutual recognition – with both states accepting each other as the embodiment of the right of the Jewish people and the Palestinian people, respectively, to self-determination – the negotiations must provide for a broad range of concrete arrangements to be made and steps to be taken in order to avoid a repetition of past tragedies.

In both strategic and political terms, a firm, stable and effective security regime is vital to the success of any future peace effort. The strategic dimension will be discussed in some detail below; but it is equally important to bear in mind that in *political* terms, the long and difficult transition towards peace can only take hold if people on both sides feel that this has made them safer, more secure in life and limb, than they were before the process was launched. If the reverse takes place - not just in terms of some sporadic acts of violence, but as a persistent deterioration of the (highly subjective) sense of security - public and political opposition to the peace efforts, as such, is bound to grow rapidly to the point of collapse. Once this happens it will not be easy to resurrect the political will, however necessary peace may seem to both sides and to the world at large. The first duty of all governments is to do the best they can to keep their citizens safe and sound. They ignore it at their peril.

In the Israeli-Palestinian context, these are not empty phrases: they are the bitter legacy of a long and traumatic experience. There were bold promises made at the launching of the Oslo process – Arafat, in his 9 September 1993 letter to Rabin, spoke of "A new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence".[5] A year later, addressing Congress (and King Hussein of Jordan), Rabin envisioned "a battle that has no dead and no wounded, no blood and no anguish… the battle for peace". As the lists of dead and wounded grew longer, not shorter, and scenes of blood and anguish became commonplace, Rabin himself acknowledged the doubt: "many of you are asking", he said to the Israeli people on 23 January 1995, "have you brought us peace or terror"?

This was said in response to one of the worst terror acts in the immediate post-Oslo era – the double suicide bombing near Beit Lid junction, which claimed the lives of 20 soldiers and a civilian. It was the result of cooperation between the perpetrators, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas; and came to be seen, within the Israeli defense and intelligence establishment (and hence the public at large) as a worrisome indication that Arafat was not willing to live up to his obligations. He, in turned, cooked up a conspiracy theory explaining away this and other terror attacks as the acts of "an Israeli OAS", a mysterious group of anti-peace rebels within the IDF: such attempts to brush away the problem, and avoid serious action against the terrorist threat,

---

[5] Arafat had in fact "renounced" terrorism – a term that clearly implies that the PLO practiced terrorism in the past - once before, in December 1988 (as part of a form of words he was forced to utter, so as to enable the U.S. to engage in a dialog with the PLO; he was told in no uncertain terms that merely to "denounce" terror will not be enough). By May 1989 the dialog was cut off when it turned out that an Iraqi-backed PLO faction broke the pledge, landing a terror squad on Israel's shore.

played a major role in transforming the political atmosphere surrounding the Oslo process, and can be seen as the point, the hinge, at which the security dimension of the process reasserted itself as central to the prospects of peace.

Rabin was assassinated in November 1995, and the shock of his loss lent the peace efforts a halo of sanctity and renewed momentum. But by the time the Peres government in Israel faced the brutal terror wave of February -March 1996, the steep death toll meant, once again, that the ongoing peace efforts had to be sustained and legitimized by measures that would prove to the Israeli public that their growing fears are being taken into account. The political imperatives changed: Arafat did finally take effective action (which only served to prove that he could have done so much earlier) but it was too late to reverse the profound shift in Israeli opinion.[6] The lessons of the 1995-1996 period remain valid, and continue to inform any serious discussion of the prerequisites for progress towards peace.

The same holds true, with an even more bitter edge, for the impact of the broader statistics, including the deadly outbreak of violence often referred to as the "Second Intifada" (strictly speaking, it was not an "intifada" – literally, an uprising coming from grassroots – but a campaign of "armed struggle" ordered and managed from above). The numbers are striking. In the comparable 15-year periods, before and after Oslo – 1978-1993 as compared with 1993-2008 – the number of Israelis killed rose from 270 to 1,450, with a parallel rise in Palestinian loss of life. In the ten years before the outbreak of the "first" Intifada in 1987, 114 Israelis died in attacks; in the years of the Intifada (December 1987 – March 1991, when Saddam's defeat stunned the Palestinians and led to a reconsideration of their position), 164; in 2002, 450 were killed in terror attacks within one year, 132 of them in March 2002 alone - leading to large-scale IDF operations against terror infrastructure and bringing all peace efforts to a halt. It should come as no surprise, in this context, that the so-called "Arab Peace Initiative", endorsed (albeit in a problematic version, which reflected Syrian demands) in the Beirut Summit on 28 March 2002, received little or no attention in Israel: this came within less than 24 hours after the Passover massacre at the park Hotel in Netanya, which claimed the lives of thirty people at their Seder tables.

Peace efforts cannot succeed, and peace as such cannot be built, if people on either side feel that their life and limb are being put at risk: this is not a matter of political caprice but of the most fundamental compact between the governed and their government. Given the territorial core of any negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, this concern means that specific measures must be in place – indeed, must be *seen* to be in place – if major territorial concessions are to be presented to the legislatures and to the public on both sides. The level of public confidence in these measures must be very high for them to have the desired impact. Still, at the end of the day it will not be the psychological reassurances but the real and practical test of deterrence and prevention, as measured against a range of dangerous scenarios, which will determine whether an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the future disposition of the Palestinian State can be achieved, can take hold, and can survive.

The implications of robust security measures in the West Bank are not confined, moreover, to the Israeli-Palestinian "dyad". As demonstrated by the events of July 2017 over the Temple Mount/ Haram al-Sharif Compound, the outcome of regional power struggles may come to depend upon the consequences of specific terror attacks, as well as upon the impact of Islamist subversion and incitement. Given the fragility, discussed below, of Palestinian state institutions

---

[6] The case of the DMI at the time, Moshe Yaalon (later IDF C.o.S. and Defense Minister) is emblematic: despite his strong roots in the Labor Party camp, his experience facing Arafat's duplicity at that time drove him to take a highly critical posture towards the "top-down" process as a whole.

in general, and of their security forces in particular, the question of effective security - in the context of a permanent status agreement in the West Bank – can be decisive not only for Israel (and for the Palestinians themselves) but also for Jordan and beyond. A strong capacity to prevent and deter any attempt to penetrate the Palestinian areas from the East means that Jordan, too, would remain safe. On the other hand, poorly designed security arrangements, which will display obvious points of weakness (such as the present international deployment in Lebanon) are likely to make Jordan a tempting target for any regional power, group or movement interested in destabilizing the peace, escalating the terror campaign against Israel and the Jews, and establishing reginal hegemony.

Once again, these are not abstractions. Despite recent tensions, Israel and Jordan have been in need of each other's capabilities for well more than a generation – indeed, since Israel rose to the challenge in 1970 – during "Black September" - and indicated to the Syrians that unless they retreat from Jordanian territory, they may face a war with Israel on their own soil. At the time, the credibility of this (effective) threat rested upon a relatively simple calculus of straightforward conventional capabilities: Israel was perceived as the stronger party on the ground, in terms of armored formations and their level of readiness for rapid maneuver, backed by undisputed superiority in the air. Today, amidst a complex landscape of a-symmetrical threats, Israel's ability to deter and prevent the emergence of threats from the east, as well as to monitor potential dangers from within the West Bank, is central to regional stability – and will continue to be so for a long time to come. Reducing this ability would run the risk that various players, as we have already seen, would try their hand at destabilizing Jordan and penetrating Palestine and Israel.

Part II: Assessing the Threat

Any effort to define what may be the security requirements, in the context of a permanent status agreement in the West Bank, must proceed from a broad description of who are the enemies of peace; why this is important for them; what could be their modes of action; where, in the context of a West Bank scenario, could they strike or try to act; and what are the factors which may hasten, or alternatively delay and even deter, the realization of their designs.

Who are the forces that can be expected to actively pursue a strategy of terror, violence and de-stabilization in the West Bank?

The most prominent element threatening stability – **Iran** - has already been accused by the Jordanian of seeking to destabilize the Kingdom: public statements to that effect date back to 2006, and tensions have become more acute in 2017. In parallel, Iran is seen by Israel as an active enemy harboring exterminatory designs: with the Supreme leader 'Ali Khamene'i aggressively committed to Khomeini's line (khatt al-Imam) on Israel as "an absolute evil", and with timelines being plotted by Iranian leaders to determine at what magical moment Israel would cease to exist, the working assumption must be that sooner or later, Iran would actively seek to establish a strategic presence in the West Bank. The utility of all security measures discussed here should be measured against a scenario involving a multi-faceted Iranian effort to realize the vision of Khamene'i's tweet from November 2014, quoted above (at the front page): namely, to "turn the West Bank into the next Gaza", in active warfare with Israel, as was the case for the latter in the summer of 2014.

Iran is a nation of 90 million, with a strong industrial base and a military nuclear program (delayed, but not reversed). Iranian military forces, belonging to the IRGC, are fighting and dying in Syria - within reach of Israel and Jordan, - and their presence may yet be used to change the

strategic equation in Jordan and the West Bank. The Iranians' methods are by now familiar: building upon local allies (from Hizbullah to the Houthi uprising in Yemen) to challenge the existing order; opening generous channels of supply, funding and training; and where necessary – and possible – introducing the presence of the foreign operations arm of the IRGC, al-Quds Force, as elite special operations units.

With some 15,000 men under arms, complemented by basiji volunteers and local Sh'ia militias, al-Quds Force can be a significant presence in any battlefield. Their presence has already been felt in the campaigns in Syria, where they have suffered significant losses, in Mosul and Yemen. In March 2015, al-Quds commander Qassem Soleimani spoke before Iranian students about the prospect that **Jordan would be next**, with Iranian influence already dominant in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and above all, Lebanon. Given the emerging struggle for control of Southern Syria, the prospects of such an effort, with what it may imply for the West Bank and the internal Palestinian balance of power, are becoming more real.

Iran's ability to move forward with such designs will depend upon Syrian cooperation – hence Israel's effort to get Asad's other sponsor, Putin, to explain to his client just how dangerous this would be for him if he let it happen. It will also depend on **the presence of Hizbullah in southern Syria**, along the Jordanian border. While the IRGC may play a role, the main burden of the effort to destabilize Jordan and penetrate the West Bank must fall upon Hizbullah, whose involvement in Syria now is so extensive (and costly, in terms of their battle losses: detailed study in April 2017 put them at well above 1,000 since 2012), that they are in effect the military backbone of Asad's war against his own people. Using the regime's difficulties in the Dera'a area, they are seeking to establish themselves, patiently, in the area, until the opportunity arises to change the regional balance.

In social and political terms, Hizbullah is a Lebanese movement, and growing unease among their base may constrain their options; but in strategic and ideological terms, they are a fully owned Iranian proxy. If given their marching orders from Tehran (Hasan Nasrallah's allegiance is directly to Khamenen'i), they may be in a position to argue but not to refuse. The de-stabilization scenario described above would thus first and foremost reflect Iran's will, as well as the proxies' actual capabilities.

The same may be true for the limited infrastructure that **Palestinian Islamic Jihad** still has (under the surface) in the West Bank: at the moment of decision, they may well be obliged to follow Iran's lead, despite the risks. Their affiliation with Iran demonstrates that the Iranian camp in the region is not strictly confined to Shi'a groups. Their specific utility for Tehran lies in the significant capacities they sustain in Gaza, including an array of Iranian-supplied rockets and missiles - which could be used to drag Hamas into a cycle of fire and retaliation, thus broadening the scope of a local West Bank confrontation when the need arises. PIJ is estimated to have a few thousand men under arms, and active terror cells in the West Bank: and unlike Hamas, they are not burdened by the responsibilities and constraints of governance.

Over the years, **Hamas** has worked closely with Iran and had been the recipient of generous support; but they are not an Iranian proxy, and in the regional "game of camps" they clearly stand with the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies, Qatar and Erdogan's Turkey. It could be said that while Hamas worked (on and off, due to tensions over Syria) *with* the Iranians, PIJ works *for* them. None of this would prevent Hamas, however – if the opportunity arises - from joining hands with Iran in a major bid to destabilize both the Palestinian Authority and Jordan, utilizing their extensive base of support and active infrastructure in the West Bank.

A detailed discussion of the role of Hamas in Gaza, where they constitute a de-facto government and have built a significant military capability, lies outside the scope of this paper, which is focused upon West Bank scenarios; but in two respects, what happened there since 2007 does have a direct bearing on any future security arrangements. To begin with, the ability of Hamas to escalate from Gaza, as they did in the summer of 2014, could act as a constraint on the IDF's willingness to take extensive measures in the case of a major West bank conflagration.

Moreover, there are lessons to be learned from the years in which Iran had little difficulty in running significant amounts of arms, including missiles, into Gaza – until the Egyptians tightened their control and destroyed much of the tunnel infrastructure under Rafah. To "turn the West Bank into the next Gaza", Iran or any other de-stabilizing power would first need to "turn Jordan (or parts of it) into the "next Sinai", i.e., a no-man's-land from which large scale smuggling operations can be conducted. For Israelis, such as Prime Minister Netanyahu, who opposed Sharon's decision to relinquish control over the entire Gaza Strip – including the so-called "Philadelphi Corridor" (the name arbitrarily given to it on the code maps), along the border with Egypt – the flow of arms to Hamas in Gaza served as proof that a similar mistake should never be made again, and Israel must retain control over the eastern approaches of a future Palestinian state.

As to Hamas capabilities in the West Bank itself, they are not easy to assess under present circumstances, and a distinction should be drawn between the movement's popularity as a political alternative and the actual ability to take power and to transform the West Bank, against Israel's will, into a base of operations. The IDF and the Shin Bet as well as the Palestinian Authority's security forces (in close coordination with each other, despite tensions and some declarations to the contrary) are constantly and actively seeking to roll up operational cells, and even Hamas' social and economic ("Da'wa") activities come under pressure. In the absence of general elections, since 2006, local events – student body councils, professional associations – do indicate that the movement still enjoys the sympathies of a significant segment of Palestinian society. In tandem with the Northern (outlawed) branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel – another branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, such Hamas sympathizers within civil society were able to exert effective pressure on Israel over the Temple Mount crisis: but it would be premature to read this as a sign of Hamas' strength overall. With many of their local leaders under arrest, it will be difficult for them to launch effective actions on their own from the West Bank, and to some extent, their operational command has now established itself in Turkey (a terror group acting under the wing of a NATO member!). A more likely scenario than a Hamas takeover would be for the radical leadership in Gaza, under Yahya Sinwar and his likes, to opt for a combined escalation - involving "popular" action in the West Bank and Jerusalem and a resumption of rocket fire from Gaza.

 "Islamic State" sympathizers and other **Salafi Jihadists** have so far been a relatively insignificant element in the Palestinian arena, and their impact in Jordan has also remained limited – not least because of the revulsion caused by their brutal execution of the Jordanian pilot, but also because the Hashemites enjoy a degree of Sunni legitimacy that neither Asad nor the Iraqi Shi'a could have. With I.S. going down to defeat in both Iraq and Syria, it seems unlikely that they or their offshoots will be able to pose a systemic or persistent threat. Still, the danger of excitable "lone wolves" and small splinter groups carrying out a singular but spectacular attacks, setting off a chain of reactions that cannot be fully predicted, was vividly demonstrated in Jerusalem and in Amman in July 2017.

Last but not least, a possible disruptive thrust might come from within Fatah – either in the form of a return to the "armed struggle" (which was tried, and badly failed, in 2001-2004); or more

likely, through massive "popular actions" modeled after the Jerusalem protests of July 2017. This may happen even under the working assumption for this paper, namely, that the Palestinian leadership then in power would be willing to come to an agreement with the Israeli side. Anger at "concessions" offered to Israel; local and national power struggles within the movement, at a point of transition; tensions between an older and increasingly irrelevant leadership and a younger generation of activists - all these could combine to create a situation in which the violent challenge to the agreements reached with Israel could come from within the Palestinian ruling party. This, too, would require a complex set of precautions, particularly if the effects would spread (as they did for a while in 2001-2002) to the armed ranks of the Palestinian security forces.

What could motivate a new wave of violence?

At the root of the patterns of violence which marked the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years – terror attacks, rockets and mortar fire, ramming and stabbings, and mass "non-violent" action (actually involving stone throwing and the use of Molotov cocktails) – is the long term effect of the utter failure of the Arab conventional military challenge: despite the benefit of surprise, professional failures on the Israeli side, and heroic fighting by the Egyptian rank and file, the war of 1973 ended with the IDF on the Suez-Cairo road and within sight of Damascus, and was in fact the last full scale conventional war: in 1982 there were limited engagements with some Syrian armored formations, and that was the last time Israelis saw Arab tanks in battle. Symmetrical warfare was abandoned in favor of a variety of a-symmetrical responses, aimed at locating and utilizing social, political and moral weaknesses on the Israeli side.

To this was added, particularly after the rise of the Hizbullah challenge in Lebanon in the 1980's, the mora imprint of the concept of an Islamic mode of "muqawwamah" (resistance) - based on the rejection of the secular nationalist ethos, and drawing inspiration from the (mostly Sunni) anti-Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan on one hand, and from the (radical Shi'a) revolution in Iran, defying the U.S., on the other hand. Totalitarian Islamism as an ideology, with its political and military derivatives, saw in the war with Israel both a purpose and a tool; a religious duty as well as a way to demonstrate that they can achieve what the secular nationalists, from Nasser on down, had failed to do. In this context, the violence against Israel, the Jews, and related targets was not designed to achieve a concrete purpose: it was a message of refusal to accept surrender to existing realities. "We [=unlike you, weak westerners…] love death" became a typical demonstrative point of the muqawwamah movements.

In terms of the rationale for action, a deeply entrenched anti-Zionist, exterminatory agenda permeates the Islamist discourse, which still carries the marks of "Radio Zeissen" and its wartime Nazi Arabic-language broadcasts. Unlike a national conflict, which can be settled at some "Zone of Possible Agreement" between two claims, the totality of the radical Islamist position precludes all compromises.

Terror, violence and incitement, moreover, are often reflections of an internal power struggle, as in the case of Fatah and Hamas; or in a broader sense, of a battle for ideological hegemony across the region. Theorists of the phenomenon of terrorism have consistently pointed out that of the three interwoven purposes of terror groups – to intimidate the target society, to signal to the wider world, and to mobilize support within their own popular base – it is often the latter which is the most important. This, in turn, determines the choice of means: the ability to carry out operations that would be not only effective but highly visible, and to demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice everything for the cause, can become the ultimate proof that one side (Islamist? Secular nationalist?) deserves to have the upper hand in the internal struggle. A similar

logic has over the years driven the familiar practice of rhetorical excess – *muzayyadah*, outbidding each other in virulent anti-Israeli incitement; a practice which nowadays meets its match, at times, in populist hard-line flourishes on the Israeli side. Put together, these dynamics increase the danger that limited points of friction could rapidly escalate out of control, requiring a strong security capacity to contain them.

What forms could a renewed campaign of violence take?

As already indicated, past experiences have made it clear that the IDF is, and will continue to be, in effective command of the traditional (symmetrical) battlefield; it has also made strides in sustaining effective counter-terrorist operations in A areas (where Israeli security forces carry out intelligence-based incursions) and systematic counter-insurgency activity in B and C areas, which are under Israeli security control. Against the background of progress towards a permanent status agreement, potential de-stabilizers such as Iran are therefore bound to seek new (or renewed) avenues for action, with the quest for a-symmetrical effects as an organizing principle. These, in turn, can be and must be countered by equally effective counter-measures. The recent past provides a fascinating object lesson. During 1995-1996, and even more so at the height of the terror campaign (the "Second Intifada") of 2000-2004, it seemed for a while as if the **suicide bomber** – a "self-propelled human missile" – was posing an insurmountable challenge: against a person resolved to die, traditional concepts of deterrence meant little, and the glorification of this form of *shahadah*, martyrdom, produced a steady stream of highly motivated perpetrators. The targets were often crowded buses, as well as restaurants, markets and malls. The toll was high (although small compared to places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, where suicide bombers have inflicted huge losses): in 2001, 84 Israelis died in 31 attacks of this type; in 2002, 225 in 47 attacks, including the Passover suicide bombing mentioned above, the worst of its kind; in 2003, 140 died in 22 such attacks. Then came a distinct decline: 55 were killed in 12 attacks in 2004, 32 in 8 attacks in 2005, 15 in 3 attacks in 2006, and then the suicide bombers attacks ceased almost entirely: there were only 4 in the decade since 2007, of which 3 were apparently carried out by infiltrators through the Egyptian border rather than from the West Bank.

What accounts for this dramatic decline? What could be the lessons learned? The is no single answer, although the timeline suggests that the security barrier, specifically designed for this purpose, did make a stark difference in the prospects of success for would-be suicide bombers: it became much more difficult for them to reach their target. There were other important factors, however, in what amounted to **a set of "sliding doors" that in combination drastically reduced the threat** (more on these counter measures – below, Part III). It helped that the "launching" of a suicide bomber is a complex operation, involving the production of the device and other preparatory activities, both technical and symbolic: thus, it is more like to "emit" early warning indicators, and can be disrupted by actions aimed at the explosives labs and other elements of the terrorist infrastructure. Actionable intelligence is central to this effective strategy of disrupting the terrorists' preparations: in 2004 alone, there were 160 cases of attacks foiled when they were already underway. The barrier (generally) and the guards on buses and in public places added a layer of "point defense", and at times paid with their lives. Over time, another accumulative factor which may have led to the realization that the suicide bombers have failed was the sheer resilience of Israeli society: would be bombers and their social surroundings had to come to terms with the idea that they are not just going to die – they are going to die for nothing.

Against this background, political attitudes changed as well. Arafat was, at best, ambivalent if not outright supportive towards the suicide bombers' campaign (which was intermittently

joined by Fatah elements, although Hamas and PIJ remained in the lead). After his death in 2004, Mahmoud Abbas took a different approach – already in 2002, he wrote a short essay, "huzimna" (we have been defeated, or rather, defeated ourselves) he railed against the "militarization of the intifada" (*'askarat al-intifadha)* – and under his leadership, some aspects of the "militarization" were abandoned and even repressed by the Palestinian Security Forces. Even if this was but one sliding door among many, it remains true for future contingencies that it would be useful to persuade the relevant Palestinian leadership to endorse the path of cooperation.

Even more complex, potentially "noisy" in terms of the indicators they emit, and therefore rare (nowadays) are the planned **squad attacks aimed at penetrating Israeli territory with a significant number of terrorists,** slaughtering soldiers or civilians, and preferably taking hostages to secure the release of Palestinians serving long jail terms for terror – once upon a time, the PLO's favorite mode of action beside plane hijacking. The offensive tunnel system built by Hamas from Gaza into Israel is designed for this purpose: but it is unlikely to be emulated in the West Bank, due to basic geographical and geological facts. The barrier and many of the existing counter-measures are also effective in this case, although this may change once the Palestinians are in full control over larger areas. Where such attacks may end up having the most far-reaching impact is in the case of **abductions,** whether in Israel "proper" or – with greater ease – on the roads serving Israeli settlements in the West Bank: given the vivid memories of the Gilad Shalit case, and of the three teenagers abducted and murdered in June 2014, this remains a highly sensitive issue for Israelis and may trigger unpredictable results and drastic counter- measures.

The settler communities in the West Bank would also be there during the period of transition – either because they will be incorporated into Israel under the terms of the agreement, drawing new borders; or because they will not be evacuated overnight. As has already happened in dozens of cases, this may lead to the intensification of attacks aimed at them. This could take the form of **penetration into homes and acts of slaughter**, with firearms or knives (as happened at Itamar in 2011 – where the parents and three children were slaughtered, or in Halamish in July 2017, were three adults were hacked to death): attacks which have stirred up emotions because of their brutality and the memories they evoke. Another common practice – which has claimed the lives of more than 260 Israelis in the decade of 2000-2009 – is **the use of firearms, particularly against vehicles on the roads,** IDF positions and houses in settlements: in the eraly years of the previous decade, with the terror campaign at its peak, there were no less than 1,900 shooting cases in 2001 in the West Bank, but here again the numbers went down dramatically – to 5 in 2009 – and have been on the rise again since 2015.

Car bombs – central to the terror wars elsewhere in the region – have been less in use in the Palestinian case (the Shin Bet counted 39 in the decade of 2000-2009), and proved to be ineffectual in the face of effective prevention: of the 32 people killed in these cases, 31 died in two specific PIJ attacks in 2002 which were essentially suicide bombings carried out by bringing a car bomb alongside a bus. All other attacks claimed but one live. As for explosive devices, there have been numerous cases – some 3,000, by the same count – but overall, the results were less impressive than the effort (in all, 98 dead over ten years). With the disengagement form Gaza and the West Bank barrier largely in place, the opportunities for successful operations of both kinds.

High trajectory attacks (mortar shells; short range rockets; in the case of Hizbullah and to some extent Hamas and PIJ, medium range tactical missiles) have thus eclipsed, for both Hamas in Gaza and Hizbullah in Lebanon, the utility of all other tools of terror, and have become the backbone of their military capabilities (alongside the attack tunnels from Gaza - and perhaps from Lebanon, as Hizbullah hints from time to time). Thus, when formulating the security

requirements for a future agreement, Israeli planners - let alone the public – tend to concentrate upon the ways to prevent a similar challenge from emerging in the West Bank, within miles or less of Jerusalem, the Airport, or Tel Aviv, and with an increased accuracy and lethality. The impact of the four "rocket wars" – with Hizbullah in 2006, and with Hamas in 2008/9, 2012 and 2014 has become deeply ingrained. The numbers are staggering. Since the disengagement from Gaza, nearly 10,000 projectiles - missiles (M-75, Fajr 3 and 5), rockets (mostly Grad and Qassam) and mortar shells have been fired at Israeli targets – most of them during the fighting in the summer of 2014 (Operation Protective Edge). Israel's major population centers have come under fire. The capacity to launch these attacks clearly reflected Hamas' access to Iranian supplies (the rockets themselves or the machinery for their production) and thus put into sharp focus the need to secure all land and sea - and when it will be relevant, air – approaches to any territory under Palestinian control.

At the same time, a severe challenge to the security and safety of Israeli citizens can be posed without any external inputs, based on the use of everyday items – cars and vehicles used in **ramming attacks**; **kitchen knives; home-made Molotov cocktails; stones and rocks** – which became prominent in the (limited) wave of violence which began in October 2015. By some interim counts, the end of 2016 there had been thousands of stone-throwing incidents (well more than a hundred of them leading to injuries); hundreds of home-made incendiary devices were thrown; some two hundred knifing attacks or attempts took place, in many cases ending with the attackers shot to death; and many of the Israelis killed were rammed to death be cars and trucks in more than 30 incidents involving Palestinians turning their vehicles into murder weapons. This has meant that terror attacks could be launched with little or no preparation or organizational support (although Hamas and even I.S. had an influence on the escalating violence through the media and the social networks, which were rife with incitement to hate and to action as well as with glorification of those "martyred" in the attacks). The "Lone Wolf" character of such attacks has required a different type of response, including a reconsideration of the relevant means of deterrence.

A thin and often murky line distinguishes such individual (or small group) actions from the patterns of "popular struggle" often extolled by the Palestinian leadership, and by advocates of "**non-violent resistance**" – which all too often does become violent: stone throwing, presumably a semi-legitimate act of defiance by angry young men, can easily become lethal, and improvised Molotov cocktails, which have also been used by protesters and demonstrators, have in several cases taken the lives of children in their parents cars or caused horrifying and disfiguring injuries. Any robust security regime, aimed at stabilizing the new realities which would be created by an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, would need to offer answers to this type of threat as well as to the more obvious dangers posed by rockets or by cross-border penetrations.

Where are the likely points of friction?

As already indicated, one of the most dangerous and destructive forms of terror threats - in the context of a new border being delineated between Israel and a Palestinian State – would be cross-border operations by terror groups intent on causing maximal damage and possibly taking hostages; hence the extreme sensitivity of the so-called "seam line" (or rather, seam zone), particularly in western Samaria, where major Palestinian population centers such as Qalqilyah and Tul Karm are within a very short distance (across the barrier) from densely populated parts of Israel, including the northern edges of the Tel Aviv conurbation.
Specific sensitivity would attach to areas vital for the defense of Ben Gurion Airport against potential threats, from high-trajectory missiles (in 2014, one attack which seemed to come close led to the U.S. authorities temporarily banning flights to Israel) to the possibility of MANPADs

being obtained by terror groups and positioned within range of the runways. An effective presence would need to be established to remove this threat and reduce the temptation to try and follow through with it.

As to the more spontaneous forms of attack, as detailed above – motivated by powerful incitement and carried forward by individuals ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause - Jerusalem looms large as the neuralgic point: the place where people of all three religions are most likely to meet, but least likely to agree with each other. Events in July 2017 were triggered by a shooting attack by three Israeli citizens, young Arab men from Umm al-Fahm incited by the northern (outlawed) branch of the Islamic movement, which took the lives of two policemen - and led to security measures in the temple Mount compound and the mass protests against them: proof, if any was needed, that this will remain a "powder keg". Creative, optimistic ideas about shared sovereignty in a living, united city would all have to be tested against the capacity to maintain security – under one unified command structure – against the range of threats described above.

The **four geographical keys to security**, and thus the areas most likely to become the scene of violent friction in the context of an agreement, are therefore the **western Seam Zone,** along Israel's narrowest point; **Jerusalem as a unified city**, under the assumption that this unity will be sustained regardless of the sovereignty question; **the new and winding frontiers** which will need to be negotiated to accommodate "realities on the ground", i.e., minimize the human dislocation involve and leave as many as possible to live where they are (i.e., in the settlement "blocs"); and finally, perhaps most importantly, along the Jordan river, where a **"long term Israeli military presence"** would be necessary in order for Israel "proper" to be safe from attack.

At what point in time could violence erupt – and more to the point, until when would a security regime be necessary?

Of the five questions – **who, why, how, where and when** – the last is perhaps the most difficult to answer. Attempts to establish regular patterns of the rise and decline in terror activity usually prove to be futile or artificial; too many contingent factors, from the personal disposition of leaders (such as Arafat's in 2000) to the impact of a single car accident (like the one in Gaza that claimed the lives of four Palestinians and ignited the intifadha in December 1987) are at work. Hence the need for the time frames of implementation, when it comes to security arrangements to be flexible and subject to review and to performance-based adjustments.

They need, moreover, to be truly cast for the long term – measured in patient decades, not in breathless years. It is neither easy nor safe to make judgements about the effectiveness of security measures, and of the underlying impact of Israeli strategic deterrence, over relatively short periods of time. Deterrence, formidable at one point, can erode overs time and became fragile: this is perhaps the most bitter lesson from the collapse of the underlying assumptions of the Oslo process (assumptions made in 1993, when the Israeli – and American – position seemed unassailable). Much has happened since to bring their validity into question. Moreover, such assumptions cannot be tested on the basis of power relations in the Israeli-Palestinian dyad alone: security arrangements will need to prove that the can also withstand, over time, the impact of regional instabilities.

Part III: The Operational Imperatives: What Needs to be Done

As already indicated, this paper deals specifically with security aspects of a future agreement regarding a Palestinian State in the West Bank, and does not presume to cover the full range of Israel's security challenges and the potential response. Still, any discussion of the strategic answers to the threats detailed above must take into account the constraints imposed on Israel, and specifically on the IDF, by the problematic reality on Israel's other frontiers.

The Regional constraints

Above all else, future security arrangements will need to take place against the volatile background of regional instability and **the rise of Iran as a dominant power.** The "stress test" as to the viability of the actions detailed below is whether they can be effectively undertaken under the pressure of threats and of potential escalation coming from several directions, and possibly orchestrated from Tehran and with other radical elements such as the I.S. "Sinai Province", not to mention Hamas in Gaza, getting involved and threatening violent reactions to Israeli security measures (no matter how rational or legitimate these would be).

In **Lebanon,** the military and political grip of Hizbullah (and thus, of Iran – seen by some Lebanese as an occupying power) is firmer than ever. With the presidency now held by a Michel Aoun, a Christian former general who went over to Hizbullah's side; and with Lebanese military units effectively at the service of the much stronger Hizbullah forces in south Lebanon, Israel now faces the very real possibility that any deterioration in the north, or even an indirect clash over control in southern Syria, could quickly lead to an all-out war, with practically the entire population of Israel under active threat. As might be expected, a major part of the IDF's investment in specific armaments, training and planning is by necessity focused upon the Lebanese arena. In recent years, a sharp disagreement over the delineation of the Israeli and Lebanese EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean has added to the tensions.

The situation is liable to become even worse if Iran and its proxies try to gain permanent control over significant parts of Southern Syria, along the borders with both Israel and Jordan. Given that Khamene'i's vision for the West Bank and for Israel would require a base from which to penetrate Jordan, it should come as no surprise that Israel has adamantly demanded, in private and in public, that any de-escalation and demarcation arrangements in Southern Syria must take into account the need to avoid an Iranian presence in the south. The IDF's agenda must incorporate, therefore, the need to prepare for such an eventuality (and to respond to it by force?); as well as the continuation of what Israel now openly calls "the war between the wars" – operations, mostly air strikes and drone attacks, carried out against targets in Syria (and occasionally elsewhere) in order to deny crucial weapon supplies to Hizbullah and other terror groups.

The question of Jordanian stability is thus central to the conceptual framework of this study. Israel's policies on trade, water and energy are geared to build up Jordanian economic stability and establish a working relationship. Meanwhile, Israeli diplomacy, both discreetly and in public, is committed to the preservation of Hashemite rule (despite tensions in July 2017), and the issue has been raised repeatedly with Israel's friends and allies in the West. Still, IDF capabilities must be tailored to the worst-case scenario in Jordan, not only because it might indeed happed - but also because the very fact that Israel is ready and able to face a destabilization campaign in Jordan makes the latter less likely to happen. The appetite of would-be subversives to try and

take power there is greatly reduced by the credible prospect that Israel would intervene to destroy them: but this means, in turns, that any future security regime would sustain this perception.

A viable security paradigm in the West Bank must also take into account the unresolved security problem posed by Hamas in Gaza, and to a lesser extent. Whereas past peace efforts (such a the Annapolis process) were based on the working assumption that nothing will be implemented until the Palestinian Authority would regain control of Gaza and can dismantle the Hamas military infrastructure (and one is tempted to add, until pigs fly…). More recent bids to resume negotiations set this assumption aside and suggested agreements over the West Bank which will be carried out even if the de-facto Hamas government is still in power, with all that this would entail in terms of IDF assets which need to be dedicated to preventing Hamas penetrations, denying them the use of their tunnel infrastructure, and deterring them from re-igniting their rocket attacks.

Defensive measures:

Given the constraints listed above, and various other possible regional complications (as well as Israel's unique vulnerability to "lawfare" and to attempts to de-legitimize the IDF's actions), it is tempting to try and rely upon defensive measures which do not invoke some of the dilemmas Israel had faced in recent; and to reduce the impact of attacks by successfully protecting their intended targets. Such defenses may include:

- Greater investment in **passive physical protection** – such as shelters in homes and urban areas; bullet-proof windows in buses and cars which drive dangerous roads; improved protective gear for troops in points of friction; regular civil defense drills and improved early warning systems.

- Point defenses, such as **guards** on public transportation and at the entrances to malls, entertainment halls and institutions, as well as **metal detectors** and other technical devices.

- Local security measures, such as building and maintaining **sensitive high fences** (wired to report a breach) and adding patrols in settlements, town and villages – drawing lessons from the failure in Halamish in July 2017.

- Maintaining, improving, ompleting, and where necessary, re-locating the **Security Barrier** (the "Fence" or "Wall") so as to cut off remaining routes of penetration and of smuggling munitions.

- As against the mortar and rocket threat, and the growing potential for accurate mid-range missiles, Israel had already led the way in **active defense capabilities such an "iron Dome",** tested in action with remarkable rates of success – 85.7% of targets engaged in 2012, an even higher rate in 2014 (the system does not waste an interceptor on an incoming rockets or shell which would fall in empty spaces. With constant adjustments, and with the mid-range David's Sling joining Iron Dome and the Arrow, this aspect of Israel's active defenses is often invoked as proof that technological solutions can replace a presence on the ground.

Preventive operations and the centrality of actionable intelligence:

The argument in favor of defensive technology, while plausible at first sight, is in fact misleading: Israel's success in containing the impact of terror attacks, subversion and destabilization rests on much more than the lines of passive and active defense. Without the grinding daily work of actively preventing terror attacks, the statistics – and the political implications – in 2000 – 2004 since the resumption of violence in 2015 would have been far worse.

At the very core of the capacity to prevent terror attacks already underway – sometimes in the nick of time – stands the highly developed ability of the Israeli intelligence community to detect telltale signs, and to translate them rapidly, in "horizontal" communication cycles that go directly to the relevant operational units, into action. T took time to break down barriers, abandon the old habits of sending papers up the system rather than straight to those who can use them, and loosen the restrictions on the use of sensitive sources. The learning curve was steep but still painful: some of the worst horrors of 2002-2003, such as the Sbarro bombing in Jerusalem, could have been prevented if the information cycle would have been shorter by only half an hour or even less. By 2004, however, hundreds of attacks were being foiled, based on highly specific all-source intelligence fusion, and this in turn was another factor in the dramatic decline in violence from 2005 onwards.

With the new wave in 2015, the lessons of the previous decade were brought to bear relatively quickly, with remarkable results – again, measured in hundreds of attacks prevented by timely interventions. In line with the changing patterns of social and personal life, this was being done sometimes by penetrating the online activities of would-be "lone wolf" attackers who seek recognition of their planned act in the social networks: once again, the learning cycle of Israel's unique intelligence collection and analysis agencies – often relying upon the spirit and abilities of bright 18 year old women and men – proved its worth.

Without this extensive, detailed and purposive intelligence coverage, the preventive capacity on the ground of the IDF, the Shin Bet and (where relevant) the Police would have been very limited and haphazard in nature. It is of vital importance, in this discussion, to bear in mind that almost all the information necessary to foil planned attacks would continue to originate from Israeli intelligence agencies: even if non-Israeli forces would be implementing the necessary action (after surmounting the dangerous barriers of language, culture and bureaucratic inertia) they would still be doing Israel's bidding and acting on Israeli data: they would thus quickly come to be seen as "the enemy's cat's paw" – and the dangers to their survival would increase accordingly; alternatively, they may choose to ignore the intelligence available to them, and then be rendered as useless as UNIFIL is today in Lebanon.

The Palestinian security forces, too, act on Israeli intelligence, and will need to continue to do so in the future. This has indeed won them the enmity of many Palestinians, who see them as traitors to the cause: but in their case, the traumatic memories of 2007, when their men were thrown alive off high buildings in Gaza, made these forces acutely aware of the existential threat they may face unless they sustain their daily interaction with the IDF and the Shin Bet.

Denying the terrorists their supportive infrastructure

In terms of actionable intelligence, denial operations are similar to the previous category of active prevention: both must rely, down to the finest detail, on highly specific intelligence that can only come from the existing array of Israeli capabilities. They are, however, different in time-sensitivity and in the nature of their targets; what they seek to deny to the terrorists is the

broader infrastructure which supports their operations, ranging from money transfers to incitement by the media. The ability to track down money trails, as well as improvised focal points of incitement to violence, led to a regular pattern of incursions into "A" areas – formally protested by the Palestinian Authority, but in effect, supportive of the efforts of their security forces.

Of specific importance, in the struggle to prevent the West Bank form becoming "the next Gaza", is the constant effort to locate and destroy any labs producing explosives, and the workshops which may be used to produce improvised rockets and other weapons (the "Carlo", a locally produced improvisation based on the Karl Gustav submachine gun, has become popular with terror squad in shooting attacks). Once again, the success of this denial effort is fully dependent on actionable intelligence.

A unique sub-category of these denial operations are the long-range strikes or raids, intercepting or destroying weapons shipments, which are considered to be a key part of the "War between the wars". In the case of Gaza, ships have been stopped on their way to drop munitions offshore, or bring the goods to Sudan or Egypt to be smuggled in; if a similar flow of supplies begins to take shape through Jordan, the scope of Israeli operations may need to be broadened.

Retaliation and deterrence

Side by side with defense and prevention, retaliatory actions which exact a high price from terror groups and their backers need to remain part of the CT arsenal. A case in point has been the problematic practice of **house demolitions**: abandoned in an earlier period (since terrorists sent by their organizations on missions were not making individual choices, and there were funds for the families to rebuild) they were revived since 2015 because they may deter a "lone wolf" – willing to lose his or her life, and with a hand already on a knife or a car's steering wheel, but now obliged to consider the consequences for the family. Like all aspects of deterrence, it is an ugly measure, but the scenes of a ramming incident are uglier; and the numbers seem to indicate that its reinstitution did have a chilling effect on would-be self-sacrificing attackers.

Targeted killings ("Focused prevention" as the Hebrew euphemism goes), on the other hand, have grown less relevant and less central. They were used regularly in 2001-2005, in areas where friction was high but Israel would not risk entangling gorund troops. Things have changed: in the West Bank, given the present pattern of almost nightly IDF incursions and detentions, killings from the air are now considered unhelpful (dead terrorists are often less talkative then live ones…) and unnecessary. In Gaza they can only resume at the risk of another all-out confrontation. Further afield, these operations tend to be rare: secrecy reduces their deterrent effect, and their utility is worth the price and the risk only if aspects of direct prevention or large-scale denial are involved.

Careless political talk before and during Operation "Cast Lead" in Gaza in 2008/2009 gave the false impression that Israel was deliberately attacking civilian populations or starving them, as a tool of collective punishment and pressure on Hamas: but no such policies were ever set, let alone implemented (in sharp contrast with the terrorists' own practices, not to mention those of the Syrian regime). **Targeting, generally, is subject to a rigorous set of requirements**, including the operational rationale, the nature of the objective, and the estimated likelihood of collateral damage: significantly, they all require detailed intelligence efforts – advances and multi-layered real-time collection capabilities and a strong data base for analysis "on the run" – which at this time only Israel can have in this part of the world.

Part IV: Whose Duty? Assessing the Options

At the end of the day, the decisive challenge of what can and will be done to establish a robust security regime, in the context of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, will greatly depend on **who will be assigned to do:** a question made even more acute by sensitivities, memories, pride and suspicion on both sides. Based on the requirements and "action items" listed above, the utility and readiness of the potential forces and institutional arrangements can be assessed against relevant threat scenarios.

Palestinian Security Forces:

The existing armed forces of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank (as distinct from the Hamas military organization in Gaza, effectively a n emerging local army organized in brigade formation) have come into being as a "strong police force" under the terms of the "Oslo II" agreement in 1995, and continue to be governed, by and large, by its obligations. their armaments are monitored by Israel and permission is needed to bring in specific supplies. They have undergone significant change in the years after Arafat's death in 2004, and major reforms under U.S. guidance have been implemented since 2007: prior to that, there were three competing structures and a few smaller ones, all busy spying on each other and serving the personal interests of their commanders (who often turned them into little more than extortion rackets).

The swift and total defeat, in June 2007, of the P.A. (or rather, Fatah-dominated) Security Forces in Gaza, under Muhammad Dahlan, created the conditions for a thorough re-structuring and unification of the various forces, which are now under more effective command and a better defined definition of responsibilities and missions. The key organizations are:

- The General Intelligence (Al-Amn al-'Am) Service – headed by major general Majid Faraj, who emerged as the most prominent among the security chiefs – is now the main agency charged with preventing terror operations in the West Bank, and thus also the main conduit of security cooperation with Israel;

- Preventive Security (al-Amn al-Wiqa'i), who carry the main burden of monitoring and repressing Islamist elements, led by MG Ziyad Hibb al-Rikh;

- The Regular ("Blue") Police led by Hazem 'Attallah, in charge of public order, crime prevention, but occasionally also restraining political subversion – a relatively professional force;

- National Security (al-Amn al-Watani) under MG Nidal Abu-Dukhan – essentially a large and armed militia structure, organized in battalion structures. Thousands of its troops have undergone the U.S.-led (and financed) training programs organized by the U.S. Security Coordinator and carried out in the Jordanian International Police training Center in Amman. Overall, there are still some 30,000 Palestinians under arms in the West Bank.

One of the distinctive aspects of the change is indeed the increased professionalism of the American-trained "Dayton" troops, so named after the first U.S. Security Coordinator, General Keith Dayton. Israeli officials regularly give Faraj and the other services relatively high marks for the improved levels of discipline and of more effective action against Hamas, PIJ and other

radical Islamists. Remarkably, this level of cooperation was sustained even when tensions rose in 2015 and a wave of lone wolf attacks threatened to lead to further escalation.

Still, questions arise as to the ability of the P.A. forces as a whole to maintain control in the West Bank – without direct and persistent Israeli help - if faced with a major security challenge, let alone with the possibility of a significant conventional enemy (should Jordan be de-stabilized) trying to launch operations across the river. The basic tension between the concept of the Palestinian State being "non-militarized", and the idea of Palestinian responsibility for security in the Jordan valley, cannot be resolved. As to the level of readiness and capacity, Israelis have been wary about taking American assessments at face value: under John Kerry, efforts were made to convince Israel that the "Dayton troops" could be relied upon, with the effectiveness of U.S.-trained forces in Iraq and Yemen being offered as role models – until both countries' armies disintegrated in the face of IS and Houthi offensives.
Moreover, the lessons of the 2007 in Gaza cannot be easily dismissed: Hamas forces in Gaza were badly outnumbered and outgunned, but disciplined and determined – and their success was dramatic. Given the flow of reporting about corruption and lack of discipline among P.A. Security officers – some of them just stamp their cards and go off to other pursuits, and others have linked up with local crime organizations – as well as the prospect that Hamas operatives have penetrated the ranks, all combine to raise doubts about the current utility of the P.A. forces beyond their current duties.

To this must be added the ongoing concern about Palestinian political uncertainties. The next generation of Palestinian leadership is an unknown quantity, and it is difficult to predict the course that internal power struggles may take, and the impact they may have on the cohesion and effectiveness of the security forces (who may end up being the kingmakers, and thus directly involved in the political arena). With Hamas well-positioned to make a bid for power during the transition period, and with a high level of tensions between local power centers in the West Bank, it is safe to assume that there will be no linear or orderly transfer of power, and that the ability to provide security and stability would be severely tested.

Jordan:

No such doubts can be raised as to the quality, loyalty, experience and resilience of the Jordanian Armed Forces and security services. Based on proud traditions going back to the British-trained Arab Legion, and the battles of 1948 and 1967 (as one Israeli burial detail wrote in Jerusalem during the Six Day War, "Here lie 57 brave Jordanian soldiers"), the Jordanian military is probably the best in the region in qualitative terms.

The Army is relatively small in size (about 90,000 men). In line with post-modern practices, it has moved from a four-division structure to a more flexible and mobile brigade-based force. It now consists of one armored, eight mechanized, and four special forces brigades – airborne, rangers, special forces, and Special Mission [urban warfare and internal security] - as well as a Quick Reaction Force and the Royal Guard brigade; and one armored division as the Royal strategic reserve. It is well equipped (with some 1300 MBTs) and very well trained, with an emphasis on the special forces, which the present King commanded during his father's reign. Jordanian forces have served on several peace-keeping missions worldwide, regularly train with the U.S. and British military forces, and have integrated and applies modern doctrines.

 The Air Force, while limited in size (46 F-16s and a few fixed-wing gunships; some 50 combat helicopters, including 16 Cobras supplied by Israel with U.S. permission) is equally well trained and has been engaged in combat operations against I.S. since 2014; the infamous case of the

pilot Mu'ath al-Qassabah, captured, held hostage and then burned alive by I.S. has led to greater Jordanian commitment to the war against islamist extremism and has become a symbol of Jordan's contribution.

As already indicated, cooperation between Israel and the JAF, as well as the Jordanian intelligence services, is close and productive, and has come to include the supply of major items such as attack helicopters; effective measures on both sides reduced to practically nil the number of cross-border penetration by terrorists or other elements, which once upon a time were a dangerous problem (an older generation of Israelis still refers to the areas immediately to the west of the Jordan Valley as "the land of chases"). The Jordanian security establishment has also been able to manage successfully the absorption of a million or more Syrian refugees, with little or no infiltration of radical and subversive elements from either side of the Syrian divide; and now plays an important role, in close cooperation with the U.S. (and Israel) in trying to prevent an Iranian/ Hizbullah takeover in Southern Syria.

In all, there are good grounds – under present circumstances – for the assertion, often made by those who advocate solutions that do not require an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, that Jordanian capabilities provide a sturdy line of defense against future attempts to launch terror attacks (or larger operations) aimed at Israel from the East, as well as against the effort to establish a supply line to terrorist and subversives in the West Bank. Jordan's role is indeed vital, and continued support for the kingdom in general and its armed forces in particular must be a central element in any security regime in the region.

Nevertheless, full reliance on Jordan may place on the Kingdom's shoulders a burden that it would not necessarily welcome; and indeed, their public calls for Israeli withdrawal may not quite match their private sentiments. Given the fragile state of the Jordanian economy; the long-standing internal tensions between haves and have nots, Palestinians and "Beduins" (original east-bankers), left and right, the Westernized elite and the Islamists, Amman and the periphery (particularly the south); and the impact of massive refugee inflows, extreme caution is called for.

Removing the Israeli presence from the Jordan Valley, in this context, would tempt destabilizers like Iran to use the opportunity and re-establish the pattern of penetration, in growing friction with the Jordanian regime. Moreover, a sharp reduction in Israel's theoretical but visible ability to carry a future conflict into Jordanian territory is actually a danger to the regime: at present (ever since 1970), any party seeking to overthrow the Hashemite House would need to take into account the possibility of a swift Israel response.

Moreover, overt reliance on Jordan as the sole or main pillar of security must be modified by the depth of hostility towards Israel (and the Jews) still widespread among the Jordanian political classes, which have been found in Pew surveys to be among the most virulently anti-Semitic societies anywhere, and continue to resist normalization - despite the importance of Israel to Jordan's security, trade routes (through Haifa), as well as energy and water supply. Effective as Jordanian security measures may be – and they are – it would therefore be counter-productive to expose them to additional strains, all the more so in a situation in which Israel's military presence "just over the horizon" might be greatly diminished by relinquishing the Jordan Valley.

A U.S./NATO presence:

The option of deploying U.S. or NATO units to defend and monitor the eastern approaches of a future Palestinian State in the West Bank (and perhaps also to man the vital early warning stations that must be maintained at the high ridge in Samaria, so as to cover incoming air threats) has often been raised, particularly by the Palestinians, as an alternative to an IDF presence which they reject as a "continuation of the occupation". Given the traditional bonds of commitment to Israeli security, which have been central to U.S. policy for decades; and the sense of affinity and commonality of interests which has emerges in Israeli interactions with NATO, it would seem reasonable to suggest that such arrangements could offer a plausible solution to the security dilemma.

Such suggestions, however, will be weighed in Israel against the sad lessons of the failure of UNIFIL in Lebanon. It is a strong force, with some 15,000 troops – including several European battalions - on the ground]. It was provided, after the fighting in 2006 (under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which Israeli diplomacy was involved in formulating) with an extended mandate and relatively aggressive rules of engagement. Nevertheless, it has totally failed in its two key missions: to ensure that Hizbullah forces would not again deploy in south Lebanon, so that effective control by the central government can be asserted there; and to block the avenues of re-supply to Hizbullah, which under the terms of UNSCR 1559 should have been disarmed long ago. The actual results can be summed up in straightforward mathematical terms: the sheer number of rockets deployed by Hizbullah, aimed at Israeli civilian populations, rose by at least 500% (!) in the decade after the resolution – and their lethality by an even greater factor; and there were zero (0) interceptions of Hizbullah arms, despite a well-document effort to re-establish their presence in the south.

One deliberate act of slaughter against the over-active Spanish battalion was enough to lock UNIFIL into a mode of action that systematically ignored Israeli intelligence reports, and made any potential action by UN troops dependent on consultation with the Lebanese authorities – which under present circumstances is equivalent to prior notification to Hizbullah. UNIFIL's presence may still be of some limited value, insofar as it requires Hizbullah to avoid overt displays of power in the south, but it may also become a serious hindrance if the situation deteriorates further and Israel would feel obliged to engage in cross-border operations.

The working assumptions for a deployment of NATO and U.S. troops in the Jordan Valley are, therefore, that they would be free of the constraints imposed by a UN mandate; and that they would therefore be able to take quick action based on relevant intelligence. As already indicated, however, only Israel (specifically, the DMI and the Shin Bet) can provide *actionable* intelligence in a timely fashion. This is bound to raise daily difficulties – intelligence dissemination is never easy, let alone over barriers of language, culture and organizational habits – and even when successfully achieved, it would bring up the problem of agency: namely, foreign forces, on what would be sovereign Palestinian soil, acting, in effect, as Israel's enforcers. The levels of tension would quickly rise, and with them the prospect of terror attacks designs to intimidate (or frighten away) the international presence. The record of such situations so far cannot be reassuring from an Israeli point of view.

Even more troubling, in this respect, would be an all-American presence. The unwritten subtext of the U.S.-Israeli special relationship, certainly since 1967, has been a variant on Churchill's famous phrase: "give us the tools, and we shall finish the work". Churchill did not fully mean it – he was elated when the U.S. joined the war - but for Israelis, mindful among other things of the sensibilities and sensitivities of American Jewry, who does not want to see young American

soldiers "dying for Israel" – the message is authentic. A situation in which Americans go in harm's way to foil a terror attack, on the basis of purely Israeli intelligence data and analysis, would be seen in Israel as highly problematic and costly.

The IDF and the Israeli Security Services:

Applying the logic of possible scenatios and challenges to the options listed above goes a long way towards explaining Israel's position on future security measures (although optimistic voices among former officers and security officials in Israel have been known to suggest a more flexible approach, which assumes Jordanian stability and Palestinian goodwill). In detailed discussions with the U.S., during the active phase of the Kerry effort in 2013-2014, Israeli arguments were raised as to the weak points of the American outline suggested by genera Allen: his professionalism and his intentions were never in doubt, but there were reasons, rooted in the experiences of the recent decade, for Israel officials to urge a note of caution.

Five reasons stand out as to why, over a prolonged period of time – measured in decades, not in years – an Israeli security presence in the Jordan Valley and other sensitive approaches (such as the areas overlooking the Airport and surrounding Jerusalem) must be the preferred option if peace is to be stabilized and secured: and why this would be in the interest not only of Israel and her citizens but also of the Palestinians themselves and of Jordan:

1. To begin with, as already stated at several junctions above, it is only (or almost only) Israeli intelligence products that can be disseminated in real time and brought to bear against an impending terror attack, a trail of supply, or an explosives lab – let alone, against a more major threat being put together on the other side of the river. Early Warning (hatra'ah) has always been one of the three complementary legs of Israel's (unwritten) national security doctrine, alongside deterrence (hatra'ah) and a quick, decisive outcome (hachra'ah): and in the realm of a-symmetrical warfare, actionable intelligence has been central to CT and Counter-Insurgency strategies everywhere. With reaction times possible measured in minutes, the level of fusion and of horizontal dissemination may constitute the vital difference between successful prevention and a failure with catastrophic consequences, and human and in political terms.

2. At the receiving end of such intelligence, Israeli units on the ground have gained persistent and intimate levels of familiarity with the physical and human terrain, with all that this implies for successful operations. True, the same largely holds for the Palestinian security forces, and of course to the Jordanians on their side of the river; but their vulnerabilities and limitations are discussed above.

3. In terms of the mid-level command structure, the present situation in the West Bank - where occasional bursts of horrifying violence should not obscure the overall success of the IDF in stabilizing the situation – owes much to the steep "learning curve" of those who served during previous confrontations at the company and battalion level, and now apply their lessons at the higher levels of command (particularly the brigade structures which have established a long-term presence in specific areas). This accounts not only for the effective response to threats but also for the more balanced interaction with the local population and with the Palestinian authorities *in situ*.

4. The points raised above as to the limited staying power of foreign forces – when faced, as they are likely to be, with brutal acts of provocation and intimidation – are obviously irrelevant to the IDF: the full political commitment, in this case, to a long-term military presence would flow from the broad public realization that this a measure necessary to secure life and limb for the civilian population back home, as well as to protect the peace

process itself from the possible consequences of large-scale attacks (given what happened in 1996 and in 2002, or in Gaza since 2007).

5. As to the most obvious points of weakness – the friction of "the occupying power" with the Palestinian population, it needs to be emphasized that the discussion here revolves around arrangements made by mutual consent: once a future Palestinian leadership would come to the conclusion that a long term Israeli presence is not an affront to national dignity (any more so than U.S. troops in Germany), it will fall to them to bring their people around, isolating the rejectionists. In much the same way, it would fall to the IDF high- and mid-level command to ensure that practices on the ground do not re-ignite such frictions, and reflect the new contractual realities which will regulate the Israeli presence.

Part V: Conclusions – Hybrid Models and Long Transitions

Ultimately, an effective security regime in the context of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement – given the magnitude of the challenge and the variety of threats as outlined above – cannot rest on any single pillar. The practical solutions on the ground will need to include a multilayered set of "sliding doors" reducing the risks of conflict: an effective physical barrier, control over the West Bank's eastern approaches, passive and active defenses against rockets and mortars, sophisticated monitoring devices and intelligence collection stations against both conventional and a-symmetrical threats, procedures for preventive actions and for military deployment in the case of major conventional challenges from outside) and agreed mechanisms for coordination and cooperation.

In much the same way, responsibility for the implementation of these measures cannot possibly fall on one shoulder alone; the Palestinian side is far from ready, the Jordanians will not welcome an outsized role in protecting Israel, an international (U.N.? NATO? U.S.?) presence is likely to run into dangerous contradictions, and the provisions for an Israeli role will need to take into account the need to dispel the notion that this is a continuation of the occupation.

Still, the argument needs to be made, based on the overall analysis presented here, that an extensive Israeli role – a "long term military presence", to use PM Netanyahu's phrase – is bound to be a necessary aspect of any agreement reached at the negotiating table. Without it, the peace that the agreement will seek to establish would be at risk from those (and they are many) who will seek to destroy it – the entire range from Iran and its proxies, to the Islamic State and similar extremists, to Hamas and other offshoots and allies of the Muslim Brotherhood – and possibly, to renegades and rebels with Fatah. Only a security regime shored up by an Israeli intelligence and operational capabilities (albeit complemented by a major role for the Palestinian Security forces; a strong and effective Jordanian presence on the other side of the river; and an international presence which could mitigate the symbolic aspects) will withstand the fierce initial attacks that will be designed to bring it down.

Therefore, the transition period - towards a future in which the Israeli "signature" can be significantly curtailed – must be long, based on worst-case scenarios, and measured according to rigid criteria of performance. Anything less, any temptation to fall prey to the optimistic assumptions and the acts of wishful thinking that informed the early stages of the Oslo process, might leave not just the civilian populations – on both sides – but the prospect of peace as such exposed to grave danger.

FRIENDS
OF ISRAEL
INITIATIVE

Join the Initiative
www.friendsofisraelinitiative.org
info@friendsofisraelinitiative.org

On social networks
Facebook: Friends of Israel Initiative
Twitter: @Friendsisrael